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Abstract
This study examined the purpose of United States international broadcasting form
its inception, and emphasized the changes in structure that have helped the broadcasters
to fulfill that purpose. The study used a three-pronged methodology involving personal
interviews, historical perspectives and participant observation.
The survey of the historical narratives regarding the Voice of America and the
findings from personal interviews with key members of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors staff revealed an ongoing debate about the purpose of a government-funded
broadcaster. The two prominent sides are those who want international broadcasting to
serve an advocacy role versus those who want it to be a tool for explaining and discussing
the policies of the U.S. The first group follows a more traditional model of propaganda,
while the second relies on the methodologies of western journalistic media to define its
role.
Recommendations based on the findings are included, as well as some general
observations to spur further research in the area of content analysis and media effects
related to international broadcast communication.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of the participation of the United States in governmental
international broadcasting, there has been a conflict between opposing views of its
necessity and purpose. First, is there even a need for the U.S. to have an international
presence on the airwaves? Is our participation in the dialogue of the world such that we
need to speak directly to the people of it? Traditional diplomacy moves at a snail’s pace,
of necessity. Responses to official opinions can take months or longer, as every aspect of
the response must be thought out and discussed by the concerned parties. A hastily
written dispatch can cause a war or long-term economic isolation. Therefore, the
ponderous movement of the official diplomatic process may be more suitable to the longterm foreign policy goals of the nations involved in the discussion.
However, broadcasting serves as a direct link with the citizens of a nation, as a
directed (or “public”) diplomacy. It appeals to the masses rather than to the elite few in
the diplomatic community. One side effect is that such rapid access to media channels
often forces officials to respond rapidly to a crisis that is in heavy news coverage, though
the situation or area may not be a priority for the policy of the nation. A Somalia or
Rwanda may capture attention for no apparent reason beyond the humanitarian appeal.
In fact, Taylor says that the agenda set by the media may bring issues to public salience
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that cannot be resolved, leaving the viewer with an unsatisfied, “Someone should do
something!” response. 1
Bickham points out that, “Reactions to the priorities of the newsroom are unlikely
to yield a coherent or sustainable foreign policy.” 2 This dependency on the commercial
media to determine salience of issues may account for the lack of a universal policy for
the U.S. international broadcasters; because they are inherently news organizations, their
focus must and will shift with the changing news cycle and stories. Because they feed on
agency news from the Associated Press and other prominent news services, they will be
subject to the short-term focus issues that plague normal newsrooms. In addition, the
policy direction from the White House will be inconsistent if the administration follows
news story emphasis as a gauge of public opinion.
Secondly, assuming there is a need for this instrument of statecraft (as this thesis
does), should U.S. international broadcasters play a public diplomacy advocacy role,
broadcasting the position of the administration and advocating for its policies, making the
broadcasters a true propaganda agency? Would the international broadcasters of the U.S.
better serve as exemplars to nations where rulers do not allow free press, serving as
“surrogates” to the local media? Alternatively, should a federally-funded international
broadcaster provide a channel through which to tell America’s story to the world, not as
an advocate, but by presenting the national conversation?

1

Philip M. Taylor. Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945. p. 96
Bickham, Edward. “Playing to the heart of the Nation”. Spectrum. Autumn 1993, p.3, cited in Taylor
(1997), p. 96.
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International broadcasting serves foreign policy best when it holds reasonable and
responsible discussion about the policy goals of its host nation, and/or those of other
nations as a true dialogue with the world. In its most suspect form, it may advocate for
those positions that it deems most advantageous to the goals of its host nation; however,
reasonable and balanced discussions will lead to a broader base of counsel from which to
draw for a well-founded and wise policy.
The danger in seeking to balance the news for a government-funded broadcaster is
the tendency to want to be sure that the opposite sides of an issue are represented, no
matter how strange or unfounded they may be. Thus, a frequent accusation of U.S.
government broadcasters is that they always sound negative on the policy issues of the
U.S. because editors seek to balance the coverage to avoid being called a propaganda
machine, and to protect the credibility of the agency and its employees. As Bruce
Gregory of George Washington University says, “Credibility is the coin of the realm,” in
statecraft. 3
As we shall see, on this second point there is much more debate than that
surrounding the first one. Some suppose that if the purpose of a “Voice of America” is to
demonstrate a free press and tell America’s story to the world, then it must remain free
from government interference. Others believe that a government-funded broadcaster
should serve an advocacy role, with some going so far as to suggest a cabinet-level
position for the directors of the broadcasters, a direct link to the government. They see

3

Bruce Gregory. Personal Interview. March 2005.
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the current U.S. services as an international version of the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting that is in need of restructuring to meet the role of advocate.
This debate addresses the very core nature of propaganda. Taylor says that
propaganda is “a process of persuasion distinguished [from] other processes deploying
information – such as advertising and even education – by the question of intent.” 4 Thus,
an ample paraphrase of the well-known communication question explains the study of
propaganda in this way: “Who says What to Whom with what Intent (desired effect)?”
The word propaganda is nearly always applied in a pejorative sense to a nation with
which another nation finds itself in opposition. However, for purposes of academic
discussion, the truest sense of the word is applied here, i.e., the spreading of particular
perspectives through mass media, or “propagating” an ideology. It is a value-neutral and
the most inclusive term that is available to describe the work of international
broadcasters, and is not used in the normal (pejorative) sense in this research.
Most administrators, frontline workers, politicians, and average citizens
vehemently will deny that any U.S. government-funded international broadcaster
participates in propaganda. By relying on the negative connotations of the word,
detractors seek to harm the credibility of their counterparts by charging them with
broadcasting propaganda. Meanwhile, those same nations participate in very similar (if
not identical) practices, and refer to it as “objective” coverage. It is often only namecalling that is irrelevant to the issues at hand. Rawnsley cites one U.S. government
broadcasting official who says, “You are not going to kid anybody . . . anywhere when

4

Taylor, P. M. (1997), p. 16
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you have an official broadcast or broadcast with a political objective that you are there
simply by accident – you will be considered and identified at all times as a propaganda
station and I don’t necessarily think that that necessarily has a pejorative taste to it. . . .”
With or without its pejorative “taste”, no one nation would be thrilled to be convicted of
propaganda by an international court of public opinion.
The vision of purpose held by the federal leadership and administration has
shifted between the two views, which has led to sporadic and reactive structural changes
throughout the history of U.S. international broadcasting. Voice of America (VOA)
research analyst Kim Andrew Elliott says, “The VOA has experienced shifts in priorities
and policies usually at the beginning of every new administration and has yet to develop
the image of consistent reliability enjoyed by the BBC [British Broadcasting
Company].” 5 As seen in Figure 1, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG, current
organizational parent of U.S. government non-military broadcasters) must oversee
multiple organizational forms, both federalized and private corporations within the
agency. This disparate structure can cause confusion over purpose, because private and
federal entities require different levels of input from the Board and therefore management
must approach each one differently. This will be explained in more depth later in this
paper.
These views have played out through history in a structural context, leading to the
current debate over the privatization of the broadcasters and definition of their
operational issues of mission. The researcher applies a three-pronged methodology to

5

Elliott, K. A. “Too many voices of America” Foreign Policy. Winter 1989/90. p. 119.
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Figure 1: from BBG FY 2005 Performance & Accountability Report, p. 9
________________________________________________________________________

provide a broad understanding of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The historical
perspective demonstrates how arguments of the past and case studies of successes and
failures illuminate and provide context for the current debate. The participant
observation provides an “insider” look at the daily operations of the news and
performance review aspects of two BBG entities, not available by any other means. It is
a minor portion of this paper, because the issues dealt in focus during the internship were
those of content, rather than structure and purpose. The in-depth interviews with key
BBG officials provide a more defined sense of how the administration of the Board and
its constituent services view the purpose and mission of the organization.
This study adds to the ongoing discussion of the mission and vision of the BBG
by looking at how these different views have led to divergent/disparate structures of the
international broadcasters. The final pursuit is to suggest how a unified structure (BBG’s
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“single system” idea, covered in the “Findings” chapter) could be achieved that would
allow for the flexibility mandated by the founding legislation, security of the journalistic
mission, and still meet the long-term policy goals of the United States as a federallyfunded agency. The approved three-pronged approach bolsters this study, and
consolidates existing information with new perspectives gained by this methodology.
It is both correct and natural to point to the events of September 11, 2001, in the
United States as a demarcation point in the history of U.S. international broadcasting.
However, the reasons the ongoing, post-9/11 change is able to occur so rapidly include
the creation of the Broadcasting Board of Governors in 1994; and folding the former
parent of the international broadcasters, the United States Information Agency, into the
State Department in 1999. These two major shifts in strategic communication policy are
reflections of the decades-long effort to define and pursue the role of international
broadcasting interests of the United States. Since its very beginning, U.S. international
broadcasting has worked to define its role and relationship to foreign policy and this
search for identity divides neatly into three epochs. The first is the early work done prior
to and during World War II; the second covers the Cold War, which ended in the late
1980s. The third period is that launched when the State Department absorbed the
operations of the United States Information Agency, except for the international
broadcasters, who became an independent agency for the first real time. This third period
is the focus of this research, and is the new “struggle to get it straight,” 6 an attempt to

6

Heil, 2003, Chapter 17 partial title
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create an agency that most effectively and efficiently accomplishes the goal of winning
hearts and minds.
Within each period, the research looks at the lessons of history, how previous
directors and parent agencies have responded to major shifts in U.S. foreign policy, and
how they handled necessary changes in focus. Each time the “core business” of
international broadcasters has changed a struggle has ensued within the services involved
to understand the role played by radio and (now) newer media. Does radio fall into the
“propaganda” arm of strategic communication, or is it a device of goodwill or “public
diplomacy?” Is there a median purpose for it? This discussion occurs daily among news
writers, editorial staffs for language services, and numerous gatekeepers within the
services. The overall goal of the Voice of America is most easily defined because its
purpose is codified in its Charter, Public Law 105-277 (see Figure 2). The Voice of
America has this legislated purpose, and its sibling services have adopted its charter
verbatim; it is the central focus of this research. Its place within the overall BBG and
strategic communication programs is defined by discussion of new and changed services
offered by the United States, specifically Radio Sawa and other services to the Middle
East and Asia.
The reason for this emphasis on the Middle East and parts of Asia is because they
are the location of most of the emerging services. These newly formed or restructured
services indicate a heightened interest of the United States and its foreign policymakers
in that region. The Broadcasting Board of Governors is required to reflect the long-term
interests of the U.S., and must shift its attention to these new trouble areas while

9
_____________________________________________________________________
VOA Charter
To protect the integrity of VOA programming and define the organization's mission, the
VOA Charter was drafted in 1960 and later signed into law on July 12, 1976, by
President Gerald Ford. It reads:
The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with
the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the
attention and respect of listeners. These principles will therefore govern Voice of
America (VOA) broadcasts:
1. VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news
will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.
2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will
therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American
thought and institutions.
3. VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also
present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies.
(Public Law 94-350)
________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2: VOA Charter
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balancing the objectivity and truthfulness that are equally requisite. Thus, these research
questions guide the research that follows:
RQ1: What is the purpose of having a “Voice of America” international
broadcaster?
RQ2: How and why has its purpose changed over the years?
RQ3: What structural changes have been made to adapt to the changed
purpose?
RQ4: Is there now a clear vision for the Broadcasting Board of Governors
which percolates throughout the entire agency, and if so, what is it?
This qualitative study seeks to understand the current state of the major
constituent part of the BBG, the Voice of America (VOA) and its supporting arm, the
International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB). A qualitative study was chosen because of the
changing nature of the broadcasters. Though qualitative research is not the preferred
method of the author, it offers a unique perspective into the workings of the organization
that cannot be gained from quantitative or outside analysis. Especially with the shifting
nature of the form and function of the IBB and Voice of America, it is better to capture a
moment of experience to help explain what “is” within the organization, before offering
suggestions for future direction.
The rationale for undertaking this study is that over $671 million U.S. taxpayer
dollars go to fund this service each year (FY 2007), with funding expected to continue
rising. Like many strategic communication efforts, it goes largely unnoticed by the
public, and most Americans would be unable to explain what the Voice of America is.
However, these efforts are largely responsible for the image of the United States and its
people portrayed around the world. In a time when anti-American sentiment is more
obvious than usual, this attempt to sway public perception abroad is a critical element in

11
securing positive attitudes. If the mission is unclear and the structure is ineffective, then
serious changes need to be made to remedy the situation.
It is also necessary to address these issues because the agency must know which
master it has to serve. If it is a mouthpiece, its mandate should clearly state such a
function; if it is to be the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, International Version, it
should know that clearly. This work is an attempt to understand and explain how the
agency has worked in the past and is now functioning, and to offer suggestions for further
improvement and development based on these observations.

12

2. METHODOLOGY

Significant portions of the interviews and research for this work have focused on
the current controversy over the organizational structure and search for purpose of the
Voice and other related BBG services. Within these discussions reside issues of new or
changed purpose and typical organizational change issues.
Three specific methods for research have been used to create a broad picture of
the international broadcast environment. These are:
1) historical narrative analysis and perspectives;
2) participant observation; and
3) interviews with key BBG and IBB officials.
The historical perspective offers a clear delineation of problems that may still be
experienced or resurface periodically. As seen in the historical narrative, the current
issues are not new to the services.
Participant observation offers the unique perspective of an “insider” through
sharing in the day-to-day experiences of the staff. As an intern in the IBB Office of
Program/Performance Review, I participated in weekly language service reviews and
senior management meetings. In conjunction with the Office of Performance Review, I
created a data set of story usage from raw data provided by the Central News division of
the Voice of America. I then sorted and reconciled this data to create a benchmark for
future analysis of story usage. Finally, I submitted a findings report, written with IBB
analyst Richard Dow, which was included in the Central News review for 2004, and
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referenced again in the 2005 review. This work helped me to gain a clear picture of how
VOA’s coverage is spread out across the globe. Participation in the weekly language
service reviews gave me a sense of the priorities (some of them changing) of the senior
management of the IBB, and added a depth of understanding that hopefully permeates
this writing.
Interviews offer a chance to have specific questions answered by those who are
most qualified to give correct information, and bring a broad-based picture of the
philosophy of the current administering officers. These open-ended questions were asked
to allow for a breadth of response that would not be feasible with a multiple-choice
questionnaire or closed-ended questions. This allows observation of emerging patterns
that guided the remainder of the questions.
There naturally are limitations to this research. The very nature of qualitative
research is that it is subjective at its very root. This does not preclude its use, as
qualitative methods can invoke a “truer” sense of what actually “is” within the piece of
the universe we are trying to gauge. Keyton says, “Qualitative research recognizes that
everything in the communication environment influences everything else. . . . Thus,
qualitative methods generally do not seek to ascertain causality.” This indicates a true
acceptance of systems theory. We cannot quantitatively examine everything that “is” in a
system at a given moment, for the same reason physicists cannot measure the location
and velocity of an atomic particle at the same moment. Therefore, the best qualitative
methods immerse the researcher (in various ways) in the environment of the data itself,
allowing a more accurate understanding of existing narratives and research. For instance,
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the administrative structure of U.S. non-governmental international broadcasting is quite
easily drafted on paper, and is the subject of much of this present research. When the
researcher immerses himself for a time in the environments of two of the subordinate
organizations (International Broadcasting Bureau and Voice of America), the reasoning
and practice behind divisions becomes readily apparent in a way that is not available to
the quantitative researcher via his methods. Ultimately, qualitative research puts a “warm
face” on the research data. Keyton says,
[An advantage] of qualitative research [is] being able to study
communication features or functions taken for granted . . . The limitations . . .
include difficulty in accessing or gaining entry to the desired communication
environment, having participants change their normal behavior due to the
presence of the researcher, [and] having the researcher be the sole interpretive
lens of the interaction.” 7
It is incumbent upon the researcher, then, to collect significant supporting
information for the conclusions attained. “Researchers use triangulation, or the use of
several kinds of methods or data, to further validate their outcomes and results. . . . The
first method of triangulation is data triangulation. By using a variety of data sources in
one study, researchers are more confident about their findings and conclusions. . . . ” 8
In this case, participant observation proved very effective, because the author was
able to participate in daily activities that were otherwise inaccessible to the research team.
The limitation of such data collection is the short-term nature of the internship. A sixweek internship does not allow the researcher to get completely inside the mind and
culture of an agency or its managers. However, it does give a clearer picture than mere

7
8

Keyton 2001, p. 77
Keyton 2001, p. 78-79
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reading of histories, or numerical analysis of questionnaires. This participation gave the
author a greater sense of what people meant in those histories, adding scope to the
observations and recommendations made in this work.
Interviews are effective means of data collection, even when not conducting
quantitative conversation analysis. The interviewees were people who are currently
directly involved with the management and administration of the U.S. International
Broadcasting Bureau, VOA, and BBG functions, or tied to its predecessor organizations.
For example, Bruce Gregory from George Washington University is a former employee
of the USIA, while Brian Conniff was the Executive Director of the BBG (Chief of Staff)
and acting Head of the IBB. These men are fully qualified to address the concerns of the
research questions with accuracy and discretion.
The limitation of the interviews is that we may expect some interviewees to be
armed with “pat” answers that are rehearsed and do not really answer anything. Another
limitation is imposed by the Institutional Review Board, which requires that all recorded
interviews be accompanied by a signed Informed Consent letter. One respondent was not
willing to go on record, due to reactions to that individuals previous statements. This
individuals perspective add to the overall perspective of this paper, and utmost care has
been taken regarding inclusion of this person’s comments, with strict observation of IRB
rules, and verification by other sources of what this respondent said. The mentions of
these comments deal with broad concepts. Of special note, this individual is a “frontline”
employee.

16
There are issues within the organizational structure of which the author and
research team are unaware, and cannot address. These factors limit, but do not disqualify
any observation made.
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3. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

We are living in an age when communication has achieved fabulous importance.
There is a new decisive force in the human race, more powerful than all the
tyrants. It is the force of massed thought-thought which has been produced by
words, strongly spoken.
(Robert Sherwood)
The United States was the last major country to have its government broadcast
around the world, but was not new to propaganda efforts. 9 A Committee on Public
Information (CPI) was created in April of 1917 as an internal propaganda attempt to build
support for American entry into World War I. 10 There were foreign and domestic
branches of the CPI, presaging later structures of U.S. information programs. The early
leader of the CPI was George Creel, who used films and print media to talk about
America. He believed that these programs were “to teach the motives, purposes, and
ideals of America so that friend, foe, and neutral alike might come to see us as a people
without selfishness and in love with justice.” 11 This was in line with the current Voice of
America’s charter. 12 The CPI was short-lived, and dissolved in 1919, having not found

9

See discussion in Shulman (1990), Wasburn (1992), and Fejes (1986) for more on prewar efforts of the
U.S. and other nations
10
Krugler 2000.
11
Wolper 1991, cited in Krugler 2000.
12
See Figure 2 for VOA Charter
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favor with prominent Republican Congressmen who disliked Creel, 13 and who detested
even the appearance that something might be propaganda.
World War II
The Voice of America became the subject of national debate before it began
broadcasting on February 25, 1942. 14 Accompanying congressional antipathy were the
bad memories of Germany’s World War I propaganda 15 and the prevalence of the “bullet
theory” 16 of media at that time. Hitler’s use of propaganda media leading up to and
during World War II had seemed to demonstrate that a speaker could plant ideas directly
into a listener through mass media like shooting a bullet into a victim. These things led
many in the United States to loathe the idea of government-sponsored information
programs. However, the Office of Coordinator of Information’s William J. Donovan 17
believed that VOA and other information efforts should not be news services, but “a
weapon using news ‘as guns fire bullets,’” to soften up the foreign public for the
military. 18 Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy held that the Army needed
propaganda as much as its air and ground offensives.

13

Krugler 2000, says that Creel had written articles against several Senators, and they were out for
vengeance, which may in part explain the dissolution of CPI in 1919.
14
Writer John Houseman is credited with starting an official entity called “the Voice of America” which
began broadcasting on this day. However, U.S. information programs predate this broadcast.
15
See Wasburn 1992 pp. 13-23 for discussion.
16
The “Bullet Theory” is sometimes called the “Silver-” or “Magic- Bullet Theory” and says that an
audience will believe any message, regardless of truth-value, if it is repeated long enough and in enough
places through multiple media channels. (See Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory for
discussion.)
17
“Wild Bill” William J. Donovan was the head of VOA’s first parent agency (though it was not yet called
VOA) within the military’s covert operations Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He was a decorated WWI
hero, and founder of the CIA’s predecessor. This may shed light on his continued efforts to make
international broadcasting a military operation.
18
Donovan, cited in Shulman 1990
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Private radio owners disliked the idea of a government station. They were still
looking for ways to make an international shortwave service profitable, and felt that a
move by the government into shortwave was the first step into heavier and tighter
regulation of their industry.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially rejected propaganda as a valid
instrument of foreign policy, but relented in the face of growing enemy broadcasts. The
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, changed the tone for all U.S. information
programs, and allowed for a reorganization of services. On December 26, 1941,
presidential advisor Robert Sherwood 19 cabled William Donovan to take charge of a
government radio station, “the Voice of America.” 20 Acting on directions from the
president, Sherwood formed the Foreign Information Service (FIS) under the Office of
Coordinator of Information (OCI). OCI used funds that required no accounting for their
use, allowing for covert operations. The Foreign Information Service later became the
Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information (OWI), with VOA as its main
component. 21,22
Elmer Davis 23 was the first director of the Office of War Information. Shulman
says, “ . . . Roosevelt appointed Davis not for his organizational abilities but rather in
order to reassure Americans that the new propaganda and information agency would be
19

Robert Sherwood was Roosevelt’s speechwriter and a successful playwright who saw the need for
international information campaigns.
20
Shulman 1990
21
Executive Order 9182 consolidated information programs with VOA as a component, and moved FIS
and the overseas branch from the military budget to congressional oversight as an executive agency.
22
As part of OWI operations, it contracted with the BBC to share medium-wave facilities in Britain, and
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trustworthy and very American. . . . The president, as always, acted with politics in mind
rather than daily administrative or a grasp of the art of propaganda. Davis had begun his
career in print journalism . . . but he was best known as a radio announcer and
commentator." 24
Robert Sherwood was at odds with Donovan, who wanted propaganda to go forth
without the necessity of truth, as a subversive force in the war. Sherwood desired a BBCmodeled service 25 in which the government only had a say in the funding, but not directly
in its content. The Joint Chiefs of Staff backed Donovan and wanted to fold VOA into
the military. Donovan was partially placated when Roosevelt placed OWI program
content under the scrutiny of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 26 Operational control in war
theaters was “subordinated to tactical military needs” under direct military command. 27
Thus, “the high-minded ideological crusade gave way to targeted objectives” and a
harsher tone for the Voice of America.
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propaganda. . . . They had to answer the question, Was [sic] the function of propaganda
to arouse listeners to take direct action, or was there another, more inchoate but
informational objective? What, put another way, was the relationship between Voice of
America propaganda and American foreign policy?" 29
The leadership and propagandists came up with different answers. Elmer Davis
believed in the existence and then in the effectiveness of the "bald fact." He viewed the
OWI as primarily a domestic service, charged with telling the American people about
how the government was conducting the war. "For Davis, however, news was effective
because America was such a great nation. He believed that if the United States portrayed
itself honestly, it would provide a beacon of light unto the world. He argued, moreover,
that only straightforward news would create credibility. ‘We must establish at once . . . in
the minds of our own people and the rest of the world that the United States Government
will tell the truth day in and day out about all developments.'" 30
At the time of Elmer Davis's leadership, the OWI propagandists wanted to use it
as a front against Nazism and fascism, and as a tool to shape US foreign policy; this
meant broadcasting material that went against the stated policies of the United States and
the State Department. In one example of this, the VOA editors endorsed the French
Resistance, while the State Department and president backed Vichy France.
As demonstrated in the case of the propagandists' continual support for positions
not favored by the U.S. government, the OWI journalists used its assets to wage the war
of ideas in the manner they saw fit, rather than operate as an arm of U.S. foreign policy.
29
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Throughout 1943, small battles over administration symbolized the fight for who should
control the Overseas Branch. Among these battles was the banning by the State
Department of cooperation between its own regional desks and the language services of
OWI. This meant that radio producers could not consult with language and regional
specialists within the State Department to improve and focus their content. Regional and
language services would wait lengthy periods for advice, because State did not have the
news mentality of getting information into the hands of an audience in a timely manner. 31
In the fall of 1942, leading up to the Allies’ “Torch” campaign into Africa,
Donovan (then as a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and head of the Office of
Strategic Services) raised the need to determine who would take care of pre-invasion
propaganda. Military planners gave Donovan a new way to “pry overseas propaganda
loose from the Office of War Information.”32 The Joint Chiefs appointed him to control
overseas propaganda three months later. This move angered many at VOA, who
resented Donovan’s repeated attempts to wrest control of propaganda.
These differences in defining the purpose eventually led to the resignations of the
first shapers of the VOA propaganda machine between November of 1942 and February
of 1944. 33 Shulman says,
The leaders of the Overseas Branch believed they could make a difference
in more ways than through shaping the political beliefs, or even actions, of their
audience. Through the power of their words, they wanted to influence the foreign
policy of the State Department in what was, from their perspective, the best way
they could work to help the United States win not only the war but also the peace.
They hoped to redirect foreign policy through the power of their propaganda.
31
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However, they met, head on, the resistance of the president, the State Department,
the military, and Congress. The ensuing political blaze consumed Sherwood,
Barnes, Warburg, and Johnson in its flames. 34
The firestorm of resignations led to OWI Chief Elmer Davis presenting the case
of the propagandists before the president. Roosevelt was preoccupied with planning for
the war, but later issued an executive order that reasserted OWI control of overseas
propaganda. It was too late for the founders of the VOA.
This administrative chaos and fight for control illuminate the underlying struggle
to determine the necessity and nature of a government international broadcaster, and the
United States was not the only nation to deal with such problems. The debate only
intensified as the Japanese surrender in August of 1945 ended World War II. Nations
sought to determine the role of radio during a “peacetime” existence. Though all sides
clearly saw the benefit of broadcasting during the war, opposition was such in the U.S.
that the House Appropriations Committee cut the Office of Coordinator of Information
(including VOA) from the 1948 budget. “The committee thought the government should
not be in the news business and suggested [some] alternatives . . . The president and
secretary of state intervened, and the Senate subcommittee restored about one-third of the
funds.” 35 The restoration of funding was tainted by a congressional mandate to spend
two-thirds of the new budget to pay private broadcasters, such as NBC and CBS, to
produce content for VOA. 36
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The State Department closed the Office of Coordinator of Information, and
founded a new Office of International Information and Educational Exchange in its stead.
OWI was abolished less than two weeks after the Japanese surrender, and its operations
were rolled into the State Department as the Interim International Information Service,
with VOA as a component. Dizard notes that the OWI was subject to closure because the
public was not familiar with its operations. 37 This is an interesting observation in light of
the Cold War scrutiny that soon followed.
The Cold War Years 38
‘Cold War’ and ‘psychological warfare’ are unfortunate terms. In reality there
is a psychological aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic or military
policy and action. This implication should receive more attention both in the
planning and execution stage of policy. But not to the exclusion of other vital
factors. Except for propaganda, there are no psychological warfare instruments
distinct from traditional instruments of policy.
(from the report of the Jackson Committee, June 8, 1953)
After struggling for over two years with its post-war purpose, a financially
crippled VOA redirected its attention to the so-called “Cold War” and the global assault
on communism and fascism. 39 In September of 1947, a joint congressional committee
visited twenty-two countries in five weeks, led by Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-New
Jersey) and Representative Karl Mundt (R- South Dakota). Mundt had previously been
an outspoken critic of U.S. overseas information programs, but he and the committee
“returned home convinced that America needed to energize its international information
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programs.” 40, 41 VOA historian Alan Heil believes that the increased attacks by Soviet
radio combined with this visit to cause the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act (P.L. 402,
properly known as the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act) in lateJanuary 1948. With this Act, the Voice of America obtained firm footing as a part of
U.S. foreign diplomacy and information programs. 42 This allowed VOA to rebuild some
of its human and technical infrastructure, and forbade the dissemination within the U.S.
of the information it was broadcasting. George V. Allen became director of the State
Department information programs and used his experience as a diplomat to gain
budgetary increases that helped establish the long-term health of the program.
At that time, the major networks (CBS, NBC, etc) produced nearly 75 percent of
the content broadcast by VOA, until some significant stories changed the mind of the
Congress and Senate. One program carried information touting races in which Indian
maidens wore only feathers. 43 NBC produced that show, but no one at the network
viewed the program except the Cuban author and Venezuelan supervisor. 44 Other stories
included those calling Brigham Young a “primitive priest” and Quakers a “social
problem.” 45 Nelson says, “The House and the Senate opened investigations into the
Voice’s activities. They criticized the lack of supervision and checking of program

40

Heil 2003; see also Krugler 2000
It is interesting to note that the conflict over the VOA FY 1948 budget coincided with the debate over the
Smith-Mundt Act. Subcommittee members were reticent to restore funding to VOA’s parent agency, and
many representatives and senators did not want to establish permanent international broadcasting. There
was the possibility that VOA would be established in the Smith-Mundt Act, but would have its funding
pulled by the appropriations process. This would have made Smith-Mundt moot. (Krugler 2000)
42
Heil 2003, p. 47
43
This statement was/is actually true, but the story did not clarify that they have clothes made of feathers
that fully cover their bodies. It implied that they were naked but for a few feathers strategically placed.
44
Nelson 1997
45
Dizard 2004, p. 47
41

26
content. . . .” This was exactly that for which the leadership of VOA had hoped, and,
“Congress quickly ordered the network contracts canceled and script-writing authority
restored to the VOA.” 46
The American media widely criticized the VOA for taking the government’s tone
in its broadcasts during the early Cold War years, even though it claimed to be telling the
plain truth. Congress encouraged editors to refute the claims of foreign radio more
quickly, and encourage resistance by broadcasting suppressed news to the totalitarian and
satellite countries.
Meanwhile, the State Department pushed VOA away from a full and fair
projection of the U.S., making it another arm in the battle for face, and seeking to make it
a propaganda department. Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett 47 said the
purpose of VOA was “keeping the Soviet bear so busy scratching his own fleas that he
has little time for molesting others.” 48
In early 1950, “Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada almost succeeded in getting the
program abolished . . . Barrett said, ‘No one could prove that last year’s funds had been
well spent by producing a cage filled with 7,000 Russians who had deserted
communism.’” 49 However, the June 25 start of the Korean conflict gave the VOA new
life and purpose, with President Truman laying down a harder line to guide propaganda
efforts.
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The Congress, in its wisdom, saw that forcing VOA to submit to strict, direct
government policy control had jeopardized the service’s credibility and effectiveness. It
became necessary to develop ways to broadcast in a more strident tone, but in a less
conspicuous manner. “General Lucius Clay, former commanding general of the U.S.
occupation forces in Europe [explained]: ‘When I left Germany, I came home with a firm
conviction that we needed . . . a radio which would speak to each country behind the Iron
Curtain it its own language, and from the throats of its own leaders who fled for their
lives because of their beliefs in freedom.’” 50 In December of 1949, the Radio Committee
of the Free Europe Committee 51 became Radio Free Europe.
Thus were born Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation from Bolshevism (later
shortened to “Radio Liberation” then to “Radio Liberty” in January 1964). 52 These new
stations became “surrogate” radio stations, broadcasting as though they originated in the
targeted country or region. Frank Altschul 53 of the Free Europe Committee said that a
key purpose of the new service was “‘to provide a channel over which American citizens,
not subject to the restrictions which hamper a government agency, could say things on
their own responsibility which it was considered desirable to have said, but which the
Voice of America, as an agency of government, was not in a position to say.’” 54 It was
acceptable for these stations to broadcast harsh criticism of a particular policy of a nation,
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because each new service operated to demonstrate how a free press system should work
in countries where no such freedom of the press existed.
RFE operated as an independent corporation, funded initially by the government
and private contributions. The private contributions were relatively small, but were used
to conceal direct government and intelligence involvement in the funding, tone and
policies of the station. Nelson says the young Central Intelligence Agency kept the
nature of RFE and RL covert because of possible opposition from U.S. legislators, not so
much as from foreign sources, demonstrating the continued domestic battles that have
plagued U.S. international broadcasting.
The wording of the Smith-Mundt Act made possible the existence of the “private”
station, by emphasizing private production of content. Historian Michael Nelson 55 says,
““RFE and RL were founded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as surrogate
domestic broadcasters, designed to be like local radio stations of the target countries, and
to deliver lots of local news. The BBC and VOA did not pretend to be local radio
stations. They were national broadcasters, speaking for their home countries but with
strong international content. . . . The Voice of America was part of a department of the
American government.” RFE and RL broadcast into Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union respectively. The CIA had a monetary advantage over VOA services, because it
had access to funding for which it did not have to account. This led to tension between
the State Department and the CIA, who had different ideas about reasonable
psychological warfare operations.
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As a private entity, RFE was free to broadcast what it willed, even if that went
against the stated policies of the government. This allowed for addressing critical issues
in a more direct and aggressive manner. C. D. Jackson then-president of the National
Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE, RFE’s founding organization) said, “We can play
tricks, we can denounce, we can take chances, we can act fast, all things that an official
propaganda agency cannot do.” 56 However, the station’s charter did not allow the blatant
disregard by broadcasters of U.S. foreign policies or of the feelings of those who
supported them (namely, the citizens of the United States).
RFE’s necessity and continuation were in doubt from the earliest days.
According to Nelson, “Altschul regarded RFE as no more than an experiment. Five
weeks after broadcasting had started he was prepared to consider the possibility of
closure.” The service did not close, though it was nearly two years before issues of
policy control were resolved, with the Americans winning the struggle against exiles who
wanted to agitate for revolution. During that time, the CIA consolidated control again
under the deputy director, and refused further orders from the State Department on
policy. The CIA formed the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) in April of 1951, which
began an analysis of RFE in December. The evaluation initially concluded that
continuance of RFE was “at least highly desirable and advisable,” that it should be
ramped up to broader reach, and that greater care had to be exercised in policy control at
the operational level. Mallory Browne was Assistant Director of Evaluation and Review
of the PSB, and believed that VOA appealed mainly to an elite audience, while RFE had
56
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peasants and workers as its main audience. These targeted audiences are very similar to
those sought by the services today.
Radio Liberty had a more difficult start, and the government funded it without
private contributions. A council of five different Russian factions, and six non-Russian
eastern European interests failed to find a cohesive vision for the service, and formed the
Amcomlib 57 without a complete decision on goals. Amcomlib was incorporated in
January of 1951, and launched Radio Liberation from Bolshevism on March 1, 1953, in
the midst of the McCarthy hearings discussed later. Krugler points out that the refugees
were never fully coordinated at RL.
The rapid expansion of the VOA and State Department budgets as part of the
Truman “Campaign of Truth” led to congressional wariness at the use of funds. The
ensuing examination brought about several investigations of VOA operations and
transmitter construction projects. Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada launched an
investigation within the Internal Security Subcommittee, with the Appropriations
Subcommittee on the State Department, looking for communist sympathizers. Krugler
suggests that this investigation may have been a reprisal against VOA for its decision not
to build transmitters in Fallon, Nevada, as requested by McCarran. The study focused on
claims by Slovak separatists that known communists influenced Czech service members
and a VOA information specialist. This also may have been an attack with ulterior
motives, because Czechoslovakia had not yet separated into the Czech and Slovak
Republics, and internal tensions were palpable.
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“A recurring claim [during this investigation was]: the VOA could never be the
true voice of America as long as the State Department managed it.” 58 A sizable portion
of this claim arose from the difference in State Department and VOA timetables for
getting out information. The State Department was likely to spend hours or days in
carefully scripting policy guidance on an issue that might require immediate attention
from the broadcasters. This sometimes led to a disruption in daily operations. A delayed
response in guidance would result in old news and fewer listeners. A hasty assumption
about U.S. policy on an issue would create a false impression in the world, and create
friction between the services, the parent agency, and the congress.
In an attempt to combat this problem, Senator William Benton led an
unsuccessful attempt to detach VOA from State in 1951, and suggested that VOA could
be more effective as a separate entity with a quadrupled budget. He pointed to
inefficiencies caused by the rapid expansion, and lack of support from State as reasons
for suggesting this change. Then-Secretary of State Acheson did not support the
separation, and considered alternative reorganizations that would not detach information
programs.
Among these options was advice from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs Howland Sargeant [sic] that President Truman should appoint an
independent commission to review the operations of the information program. Another
suggestion involved the establishment of a semi-autonomous agency within State that
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would continue to connect on matters of policy. 59 This suggestion led to planning for an
alternative when Benton brought his ideas to the floor. The primary goal of the planned
agency was to keep the broadcasters and information programs within State. The general
sense was that an internal program made simpler the solution to problems of guidance
and field integration. Benton’s plan faltered as Senator Karl Mundt sought House
support to bring VOA into the TV age by promoting a “Vision of America” service. 60
This delay gave State the time to develop its own internal agency with major changes in
overall structure, called the International Information Administration. International
information programs were placed under a new administrator. However, VOA policy
remained firmly in the hands of State Department officials. Domestic public affairs
information remained under the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
The new structure failed to provide a fix for the continuing problems. Additional
complications with the expanded building of transmitters to reach the “Iron Curtain”
countries brought down the fury of the U.S. House and Senate on the leadership and
organization. Disagreements by technical experts over the best locations for transmitters
accompanied congressional attempts to influence the choice of locations and contractors,
and a lack of proper funding for a major expansion of transmitter capability known as the
“Ring Plan” proposed in 1950. This plan was intended to surround, or “ring” the Soviet
Union with transmitters that could reach the entire landmass. One contractor, Murry
Brophy, served as a location consultant while bidding for the construction rights.
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The Senate approved “a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations
Committee to examine the IIA’s operations” in June 1952. 61 J. William Fullbright
originally chaired this subcommittee, but relinquished his position when the Republicans
regained control of the Senate in the November 1952 elections. Bourke B. Hickenlooper
became the namesake for the subcommittee. Hickenlooper had traveled with the SmithMundt contingency in 1947 and supported the Act, but had since developed doubts about
the operations of VOA. These concerns included the ever-present suspicion that
communist sympathizers were prevalent in the agency, continuing problems with policy
channels between New York and D.C., and the integration of VOA with Foreign Service
officers. Interestingly, Hickenlooper noted from a personal trip that people received the
BBC and Radio Moscow more easily than VOA, a problem that plagued VOA from its
very first days on the air. This was due to a stall in the “Ring Plan” mentioned before.
These problems led to a request by the subcommittee for an extension to its investigation.
The Senate extended the deadline to June 1953, causing it to overlap with the exploration
of the Senate Government Operations Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, known as the McCarthy hearings.
In February of 1953, four days before the Senate voted to extend the
Hickenlooper investigation, Senator Joseph McCarthy launched an investigation into the
alleged infiltration of VOA and its parent agency, the State Department, 62 by Communist
sympathizers and so-called “fellow travelers.” McCarthy had lodged similar complaints
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against the State Department in 1950. In this case, McCarthy better used the electronic
media and news organizations to his benefit.
Apart from any legitimate concerns the Senate committee had, agency employees
used the hearings to get back at bosses or fellow employees with whom they had
disagreements. 63 Even though the hearings found no clear proof of Communist
employees, the scathing criticism and (apparently) unfounded scrutiny endured by the
leadership crushed the morale of the employees of VOA, caused the resignation of
several key leaders, and led to the suicides of at least two. Continuing cuts in staffing
and funding had already taken their toll on the Voice, and the management had to bleed
funds from long-standing services to continue operations in the newly important Soviet
bloc. 64 McCarthy moved on to investigating the Army, as the VOA worked to pick up
the pieces and deal with other investigations into its activities.
Another group looking into the structure of information programs was
Eisenhower’s President’s Committee on International Information Activities, known as
the Jackson committee. 65,66 The goal of this inquiry was to determine whether VOA
belonged in the State Department. Eisenhower also created a President’s Advisory
Committee on Government Organization (the Rockefeller committee), tasked in part with
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considering possible reorganization of the International Information Agency. Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles was more interested in the implementation of policy and felt
the information programs did not belong in State.
The Rockefeller committee recommended the establishment of the United States
Information Agency, a separate agency that would report directly to the president, and
administer both the information and cultural programs. The educational exchanges
remained under the Department of State.
The USIA was not an entirely new concept. Nelson Rockefeller had begun
information programs and cultural exchanges with Latin America in 1940, to help win the
minds of those he felt were being subverted by German propaganda. His exchanges
included art works and economic assistance, and operated under the auspices of the
Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA). CIAA broadcasted to Latin
America by leasing time on U.S.-based commercial transmitters. The basic structure for
operating the CIAA became the footing for USIA.
USIA formally came into existence on August 1, 1953, with a mandate to
consolidate all its operations in the same city, Washington, D.C.” 67 This major change in
organization allowed for a lessened amount of direct governmental content control within
VOA. By moving all policy decisions to D.C., the agency addressed the earlier policy
guidance issues in a new structure that allowed for more journalistic freedom and
required less time to get correct and representative information to air. As Krugler 68
notes, this new agency gave VOA a new start after the excruciating examination it had
67
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endured since its earliest days. As the USIA launched, VOA took a step in earnest
towards an autonomous existence in an independent agency.
For the VOA, this became a relatively calm era. There were continuing conflicts
between Congress, State, Defense, and the agency, but these could not compare in scope
to the bitter infighting and struggle for direction of the early days of Voice of America
programming. Policy guidance was still firmly in the control of State, but the content
creators were at greater liberty. President Eisenhower repeatedly supported the USIA in
a very public manner, and lobbied for budget increases, helping to raise the morale of the
personnel. When the president and Senators including Lyndon B. Johnson attempted in
1957 to merge USIA back into State, John Foster Dulles blocked the move, showing his
continued lack of interest in doing more than monitoring the information programs.
Dulles also continued to express an isolationist viewpoint by rejecting the importance of
foreign public opinion in shaping U.S. foreign policy. 69 This lack of acceptance of input
by USIA into policy led to an introspection and internal reorganization. The interest in
helping to shape foreign policy is reflective of early propagandists’ attempts that led to
the early conflicts with State and Defense. Direct input and discussion of foreign policy
by USIA leadership was limited to the interagency Operations Coordinating Board,
which President John F. Kennedy abolished, eliminating the only place where USIA had
clearly defined policy roles in relation to State and the NSC.
When the public learned of the CIA funding of RFE and RL in the early 1970s,
Congress quickly introduced legislation to reorganize them under a single private

69

Dizard 2004, p. 68

37
corporation, with congressional oversight of funding. The new Board for International
Broadcasting (BIB) became the home for RFE and RL as they consolidated operations.
The Board consisted of five part-time members, chosen by the president with the advice
and consent of the Senate. This move cut the direct ties between RFE/RL and the CIA.
The one event of greatest importance to VOA during the years of USIA was the
drafting of a VOA Charter that guides the agencies operations to this day. This defining
of broad purposes was the first concrete statement of the principles behind the VOA.
USIA director George V. Allen charged then-Deputy Director of VOA, Jack O’Brien
with culling some semblance of a purpose statement from hundreds of pages of agency
suggestions. VOA director Henry Loomis, Allen, and O’Brien wisely saw the need to
create a document that reflected long-term interests of the agency, rather than focusing on
the Cold War “east vs. west” conflict of the time. O’Brien came up with a “boil down”
of the themes he saw repeated, and combined them into a four-paragraph account. 70 The
Charter was initially an executive agency directive, and was passed into law on July 12,
1976 as Public Law 94-350. 71
VOA had established a film and television unit in the 1950s, but it had been
removed to USIA to allow for broader use of its capabilities in 1963. 72 Then, in 1983,
USIA Director Charles Wick launched WorldNet Television as the world’s first global
satellite network, using the resources of this division. The system provided content to
embassies and local TV stations in various countries. This allowed USIA and VOA to
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circumvent many local controls imposed by host countries. An excellent example of this
is the broadcasting of South African viewpoints that white-controlled state media
operations would not allow. Heil says that WorldNet was dominated by Foreign Service
officers (FSO’s) who believed its purpose was to articulate U.S. foreign policy. 73 To
help resolve this, the Congress passed legislation “applying the VOA Charter, verbatim,
to WorldNet Television—including its mandate of objective news,” in 1987.
A far more controversial service (then and now) launched in 1985, known as
Radio Marti. This service focuses on Cuban listeners. A strong Cuban -American
Foundation lobbied Congress for the service. The service frequently comes under fire in
appropriations hearings because of an apparent lack of listeners, combined with the
effectiveness of Fidel Castro’s jamming stations. Castro’s counteroffensive was/is
capable of jamming radio stations as far north as Chicago, IL. Radio Marti may continue
to operate because of a significant Cuban population in South Florida where the station
originates, inducing a lack of willingness by members of Congress to close it. TV Marti
followed in 1990, broadcasting from an industrial aerostat balloon above the Florida
Keys.
In the 1990s, WorldNet and VOA-TV units moved towards integration. There
was a predictable clash between the two cultures, as the news professionals of VOA and
the policy gurus of USIA quarreled over distribution of resources. The VOA journalists
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mistrusted the policy-laden approach of the Foreign Service Officers, and the FSOs were
wary of the “freewheeling” VOA staff. 74
The Formation of BBG and Separation from State
At the same time, VOA and its related services were making their final move
towards independence and permanent status. In 1993, President William J. Clinton’s
administration mandated that RFE/RL should remain on the air, despite opposition from
White House aides. In July of 1993, Senate Foreign Relations Committee members
combined VOA, VOA engineering, and the Bureau for International Broadcasting
(grantor for RFE/RL in 1993) into a single line-item for the first time distinct from USIA.
However, VOA did not separate from USIA oversight. On April 30, 1994,
Clinton signed the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994. The act
established a bi-partisan Broadcasting Board of Governors within USIA “to oversee (1)
VOA, the Martis, Worldnet [sic] Television, and associated engineering and support
operations under the new International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), and (2) RFE/RL” as a
non-federalized, private corporation. 75 The Act also created Radio Free Asia (RFA), and
abolished the BIB.
For employees and administrators of VOA, a critical flaw of the Act was the
abolition of its Charter (P.L. 94-350) by the bill’s language. The VOA Charter was (and
is) a shield and “a firewall against bureaucratic and political intrusion into VOA’s
reporting of the news.” 76 Staff and former administrators immediately sought to have the
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Charter reinstated as a technical amendment to the bill. The House approved the
amendment, but the Senate was slow to move. It was not until October 8 that the Senate
passed the amendment by voice vote before ending its second session. Clinton signed the
reinstated charter (minus language that VOA was the broadcast service of USIA) on
October 25, 1994, as Public Law 103-415.
VOA came under fire in a 1995 House Budget Committee report that proposed
the closing of over a dozen federal agencies. The service found friends on both sides of
the aisle who left it intact. Twenty-eight employees were released to meet budgetary
requirements, mostly in Eastern European services. RFE/RL also was forced to reduce
its workforce by 800, and relocate its headquarters to Prague, Czech Republic. Between
1994 and 1996, VOA, RFE/RL and Radio-TV Marti lost $137 million in budget and
1,500 broadcast jobs, as hiring began for Radio Free Asia in 1996. RFA began to
broadcast on September 29, 1996.
Clinton appointed the members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors in 1995.
As the Board held its first meeting, all U.S. international broadcasting efforts were
brought under one entity, one only nominally associated with USIA. The BBG made
independence a priority, accompanying expansion plans in the Balkan region, and the
mandated creation of Radio Free Asia. In late 1996 and early 1997, board members met
with Senator Jesse Helms and his staff, and stressed “the importance of independence to
the credibility of the broadcasting entities, federal [i.e., VOA] and grantee [i.e.,
RFE/RL]. 77 Helms and his aides did not want to create a new bureaucracy while in the
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process of eliminating others for budgetary reasons. They also stressed that VOA had to
retain the official government editorials in order to have a hope of independence. The
fact that an “organizationally distinct” office of the International Broadcasting Bureau
wrote the policy statements made this a viable option for VOA. 78
On March 8, 1997, USIA director Joseph Duffey appealed to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to reexamine the authorities of the BBG, with the possibility of
revisiting the 1994 Act. Senator Joseph Biden, a strong supporter of the independence of
the grantees, was absent from the room, but returned very quickly when he heard this.
He said that he would recommend the return of USIA to State, with all of the
broadcasters becoming fully independent “under a board whose authorities would remain
intact.” 79
In April 1997, the White House signaled its support for a reorganization of the
foreign affairs programs, including returning USIA to the State Department. However,
the future of broadcasting was initially uncertain. To worsen matters, the House passed a
bill to put USIA with the BBG back into the State Department. In June, the bill went to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Jesse Helms and Biden proposed to
change this plan to place VOA, the Martis, and the surrogates under a separate board.
Senator Russell Feingold noted that RFE/RL had spent extravagantly during the Bureau
for International Broadcasting years, with executive salaries as high as $300,000 a year.
Feingold also was unwilling to create another board and a new agency, while abolishing
USIA. He introduced a bill to place all of the radios into the State Department with
78
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USIA. The committee voted against the Feingold Amendment 14-3. The Helms-Biden
amendment passed committee and was presented to the full Senate as the 1997 Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. Biden was primarily interested in maintaining the
journalistic integrity of the grantees. Heil notes that VOA was merely “the caboose on
the independence train.”
The Senate defeated a further attempt by Feingold to amend the bill, and passed
the authorizing legislation. However, Senate-House conferences lasted for months, and
refined the 1997 Act to require the continuation of the government editorials. Additional
changes included a mandate to develop a “surge” capability during crisis times (discussed
more in the next chapter), allow use by the Secretary of State of WorldNet TV for “policy
oriented interactions between overseas embassies and Washington,” 80 and establish
RFE/RL broadcasts to Iraq and Iran. 81 Congress stalled the bill while it fought with the
White House on unrelated policy issues before recessing for the winter. The conference
committee report was finally published on March 10, 1998, after Congress reconvened.
The bill would have lain dormant for much longer, but was tacked onto an omnibus
appropriations bill, remaining largely unnoticed. The House passed the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999
(Public Law 105-22), providing for the establishment of the broadcasting services under a
newly independent BBG, effective October 1, 1999. The Senate passed the bill, and the
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president signed it on October 21 of 1998. Heil states, “Independence [came] at last, ‘on
little cat feet.’” 82
The Conference Report on the 1998 Act states that the independence of the BBG
is critical to maintaining the integrity of the journalists, and for providing an “arm’s
length” approach to governing the broadcasters (Report HR 105-432). This distance
provides the State Department or other government official the ability to deny plausibly
that she or he has any part in the decision making process behind the programs, and refer
that person to the BBG. The report states, in part, “Establishing this structure is not to
deny that the broadcast entities are funded by the United States government—quite
obviously, they are. This structure in no way should be construed to lessen the
responsibility of the Board to ensure that U.S. broadcasts are ‘consistent with the broad
foreign policy objectives of the United States . . . . In truth, the State Department will be
able to deny responsibility for a specific broadcast—because it will have denied itself the
ability to directly affect the content of any specific broadcast.’” 83
A basic assumption of this independence is that the deniability factor provides an
additional level of protection for the journalists, and helps to improve their credibility
with the target audience. To maintain a necessary “dotted line” connection to the foreign
policy goals of the U.S., the Secretary of State became an ex officio member of the BBG,
and serves as a consultant in the development and closing of language services. The
Inspector General of the State Department was charged with the review of BBG, but the
law banned an evaluation of the philosophical or political perspectives of any broadcast.
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Perhaps the most important aspect of this independence is the capability of the
broadcasters to provide a “surge capacity to support broad U.S. foreign policy objectives
during crises abroad.” 84 When the BBG was established as a separate entity, no one
could have predicted the events of September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The
relatively new independence of the broadcast services was tested as the BBG moved to
develop and implement services for the new strategic interests of the United States.
Among the new services was an expanded operation to the Middle East and Arabic parts
of Asia, known as Radio Sawa. This new RFE/RL-styled service operated with a more
entertainment-driven format that focused on a mixture of western and Arabic popular
music. Some analysts of the addition of another grantee organization have said that it
was unnecessary, because VOA had to close its own Arabic service to make way for
Sawa. 85
Authors have written much about the history of VOA from its earliest days,
rightly focusing on different periods of the organization’s history, and especially on
content issues. The remainder of this work seeks to understand what recent works have
not clearly stated: What was the rationale behind folding USIA into State, and leaving
international broadcasting as an independent agency? What is the proper position of that
“firewall” control barrier? What are the structural and functional issues for the BBG
going forward? How might the administrative decisions regarding new services shape
the VOA in the future? Ultimately, what should the structure and control of the agency
look like for best efficiency in meeting the mission and vision of the agency?
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4. FINDINGS

The issues of structure and purpose that have faced the government international
broadcasters of the United States since the early days appear to have originated with a
disagreement regarding the appropriate strategy for reaching the target audiences, and/or
a failure to identify the target audience. VOA and the surrogates have succeeded most
during times when the purpose was clear and the structure was able to change to fill that
purpose. Those times, unfortunately, have also been when the services have broadcast a
harder tone, similar to the propaganda of the Soviets or Germans. John Lennon, head of
the International Broadcasting Bureau’s Office of Performance Review, suggests that the
purpose of VOA was clear at its beginning in World War II, but became unclear
following the war, leading to uncertainty about the purpose and necessity of a
government broadcaster. This happened again at the end of the Cold War. Lennon says
the credit that VOA and RFE/RL received for helping to win the Cold War and the
VOA’s successes of WWII “contributed to an absence of will on the part of Congress to
terminate ‘effective at noon tomorrow’ the VOA . . . deciding it would be a Cold War
anachronism. And so it perpetuated its existence over a period of time.” 86
There has been renewed fervent discussion regarding the role of a governmentfunded broadcaster in public diplomacy since the founding of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors. Bruce Gregory of George Washington University says that decision makers
and taxpayers have many forms of statecraft with which to operate, and that the current
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role of the BBG services is to play a part in the overall strategic communication strategy
of the United States. The public diplomacy function of the broadcasters is only one part
of the equation. The problem, he believes, is in determining how to make all of those
parts work together. 87 Broadcasting, he says, “has independent organizational status. It
has mission statements that vary considerably from the mission statements of other
actors. But importantly . . . it is a part of public diplomacy that involves a set of norms
which come out of the world of journalism. . . . It’s the linkage of journalism norms to a
government-funded activity, which falls within the broad framework of strategic
communication. . . .” 88
Broadcasting Board of Governors Chair Kenneth Tomlinson reiterates the need
for understanding the difference between the advocacy purposes of the State Department
and the efforts of broadcasters, saying, “We need to understand the importance of
maintaining the strength of public diplomacy and the traditions of international
broadcasting. I am convinced that we will not be successful in our overall mission of
delivering our message to the world if we fail to grasp that these are two different spheres
and that they operate according to two different sets of rules.” 89
The Conference Report accompanying the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act acknowledges these “two sets of rules” when it prohibits the Inspector
General of the State Department from evaluating broadcast content, though it charges that
office with the regular audits of the BBG. “The Inspector General must take great care in
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reviewing broadcast operations, for, as noted earlier, international broadcasting is not a
typical government function. The broadcasters are journalists, and the Inspector General
must no be involved in second-guessing the daily decisions of journalists and their
editors. To do so could have a chilling effect on the activities of the journalists.” 90
However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) does not separate
the two sets of rules, treating the State Department and broadcasters as though they share
an identical mission and purpose:
While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism,
we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide State’s, BBG’s, and other
federal agencies’ communication efforts. The absence of such a strategy
complicates the task of conveying consistent messages to overseas audiences. 91
Such a strategy is only necessary if the two share an identical function. The goal
may be the same, but operational means (i.e., functions) are different. The public
diplomacy advocacy and explanation of policy are vested in the State Department, while
the BBG is solely charged with the explanation of policy and life in the U.S. Thought no
interagency strategy on means of achieving the goal is present, there is an attempt at
consensus, as the broad policies of the BBG are guided by interaction with the State
Department on areas of significance to national foreign policy.
There may be an even deeper problem than not having an interagency strategy on
mission. In this same report, the GAO commended the BBG for its “Marrying the
Mission to the Market” five-year strategic plan, but said that it lacked measurement of
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progress on long-term goals. 92 This lack of visible progress may come from a lack of
understanding at the agency level what the long-term mission is for the BBG. As
Gregory points out, the coordination between agencies and the foreign policy goals of the
U.S. is episodic and subject to election cycles. 93 Meanwhile, the employees often remain
through the changes. There is a need for clarity of purpose that transcends election
cycles, and is perhaps absent from all levels of the agency. This need for clear direction
may be a symbol of a larger deficiency in consistent direction on foreign policy that dates
back to the end of the Cold War.
John Lennon says the changing debate about defining purpose and maintaining
the journalistic integrity of the agency is the key issue for the agency:
This is something that has been discussed and debated and agonized over,
most especially since the advent of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 50s
when we actually had people committing suicide because their careers had been
ruined, and heated debate over the extent to which independent free thinking
journalism should be tolerated within the walls of this government agency. That
was why the charter was written. That is why law was passed saying VOA is
required to report accurate and objective news. It was a consequence of the
debate over whether this place was engaging in propaganda – that is to say biased
reporting in favor of something or against something – that there was a felt need
to define what the role of VOA was. . . .
So the debate currently is the extent to which the United States should
broadcast anything other than public diplomacy messages to publics abroad that
do not like this country. Why should we feed that appetite? The answer is I
believe because the guiding principle has always been – certainly, when we were
broadcasting into the Soviet Union where there were plenty of people who didn’t
like us – give them the facts, tell them the truth. Whether they accept it or not is
up to them, but in any case they will have the information that they need in order
to decide for themselves. If you simply present the official line, the message, you
will have given them nothing of value. You will only have told them how you
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feel. Arguably, they do not need to know how you feel. They need to know what
is true. 94
This perspective is a good example of why the surrogate broadcasters may be
more effective. If you are able to speak the truth to a targeted nation in an unmodified
tone, then you may have better success in creating credibility with the listeners.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many within the organization felt a lack of
direction and purpose following WWII, that was replaced by the fervor (and funding) of
the Cold War. John Lennon says that neither the vision nor the mission of the BBG is
currently entirely clear either, though:
The BBG would disagree with that. They have, in fact, published a Strategic Plan
for 2002-2007 . . . and that is fine as far as it goes. 95 I would respectfully say that
this is another example of something written by a committee and it is therefore
left more as a consensus document than a clear and concise expression of the
vision for US international broadcasting writ large. The mission of the place
continues to be to broadcast on mass media, using the media that people use, to
transmit messages. Now, it’s at this point that things become a little hazy in
contemporary terms because the United States as a country, as a nation, a people,
has enjoyed favorable status for certainly the last half of the 20th century and
really until the last five or six years. During the last period of years, . . . we have
seen whole populations do an about-face in terms of their respect for the United
States and the degree to which they are willing to trust the American people. That
is a phenomenon that we are unused to. We have never experienced that before. .
..
But the key for us here is, what is the extent to which that phenomenon
has reshaped our vision? One could fairly say that the vision for the VOA for a
long, long time was that peoples within our reach would be free, out from under
the yoke of oppressive regimes, and able to operate in an economic sense
independently, in other words, to enjoy a free market system of some kind. Our
vision now might be stated somewhat differently. That is to say, those same
people should operate freely, in a democratic context free of terror and other
forms of oppression. But our mission focuses on the terror part. This
administration [George W. Bush] now into its second term, for all the obvious
reasons has made it quite clear that it intends to rub out tyranny, it intends to fight
94
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the war on terror, it intends to eliminate despotic regimes in whatever ways it can.
. . . And so the mission of the VOA is clear depending on your perspective.
Now, if you stand way back and you look at all of that, what it means is
it’s not possible to say clearly as it once was what the mission of this place is.
You could look to the VOA charter and the three things that are inscribed there as
what it is that is important for VOA to do . . . . That constitutes a mission, but one
could re-examine those three things in the light of modern circumstances . . . . Is
our mission as striking as it once was? Some places it is, some places it is not. It
is just not as clear . . . . But it is earning the attention and respect of audiences that
is something that is still incumbent upon us in carrying out whatever revised
mission we choose to carry out.96

The 2000 BBG Annual Report offers a look at the discovery of purpose after the
end of the Cold War:
The creation of an independent BBG also belies arguments that U.S. governmentsupported international broadcasting is a Cold War institution whose work is long
completed. International broadcasting will continue to be vital as long as
segments of the world’s population are denied access to a free press and as long
as they hunger for alternative sources of news and information about their own
countries and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War was not the end of
history; nor did it end repressive regimes. On the contrary, our mission is
growing, and we are adapting and improving our methods of delivering news and
information to people around the globe who live under totalitarian regimes that
want to control the news media and block out truthful information.
The BBG’s Executive Director Brian Conniff agrees there has been some
questioning of the purpose since the end of the Cold War, but does not agree that the
agency has experienced an identity crisis or lacks strategic direction. He says that in the
new War on Terror the BBG has found new vigor:
There have always been - and continues today and maybe forever - different
perceptions of what broadcasting’s role is. And, sometimes it has fairly nuanced
the difference, the different perceptions, but they can be fairly significant. We are
dealing with it right now with the rise of anti-Americanism, low standing of
America in the world, particularly in key areas. What is broadcasting’s role, and
96
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what is our expectation? What are we supposed to do? Are we supposed to
change people’s minds?
Conniff says that the BBG returns to the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1994 as the best indicator of congressional intent. The act
deliberately separates the advocacy function into the State Department, but leaves the
journalistic mission with the BBG. He says that many people in Congress and the White
House question why the BBG does not serve an advocacy role, while the journalists say:
‘No, we have a journalistic mission in the providing of information,
accurate news and information, and an explanation of American foreign policy;
not an advocacy, but an explanation. That provides the input into somebody’s
mind to make the right decision about America, and that is the effective way to
change people’s minds. Not constantly telling them America’s right, and the
advocacy of the policy, that is propaganda. When your deliberate attempt is to
change the minds, that is propaganda. We’re not propaganda.’ So we all had the
same goal, but our methods are different than State Department’s public
diplomacy. . . .As the world conditions change, we get pressured to have a slightly
different role, and because of the poll results overseas that showed such a strong
anti-Americanism, that makes people think, ‘Well, you know, you ought to be
doing something about it.’ We are, but not necessarily the way they think we are.
. . . It’s a healthy debate.” 97
The debate continues, as the two sides firmly pursue their goals based on
presuppositions about the nature and effect of international communication. The VOA
has pursued the journalistic mission for most of its existence, and so VOA Director David
Jackson suggests that the BBG flagship’s role has not changed significantly since the
founding of the BBG and 9-11, saying:
I do not think the role has changed that much. The role has always been to
provide objective, reliable, balanced news and information to people who do not
have access to that. Secondly, it is to provide an accurate description of what the
US policies are, and of who Americans are and what we believe in. . . . You
know, the world is constantly changing and our mission changes with it but the
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main thing that changes is where we do our mission not how we do it [emphasis
mine]. 98
Lennon says the creation of the BBG caused some difficulties, especially for
VOA, but led to improvements in VOA’s content, the development of new services and
expansion into “new” media (the “how” and “where” of broadcasting):
They [the BBG] had to formulate an agency, create it from scratch using all the
component parts they had been given. They had to create Radio Free Asia, which
became a part of this agency; and they had to sort of bring to heel the Office of
Cuba Broadcasting, which was something no one had been able to do up to that
time, and in fact has only really come to pass in the last I would say two or three
years.
VOA found itself gradually diminishing in terms of its stature, within the
agency, and in terms of its ability to compete effectively as the premiere
international broadcaster from the United States. There are a whole lot of reasons
for this and this is not something that you can blame on the Board even though
they sometimes do get blamed by VOA. But in fact, the Board had a
responsibility to balance the various entities within its purview and make sure that
all of them functioned effectively. Inevitably, the biggest one is going to get hurt
a little bit as resources are bled away. But for the last five years . . . the BBG has
been having an increasing impact on VOA . . . by dealing with such critical issues
as creation of television programming, creation of internet capability, dealing with
overlapping languages as between RFE/RL and VOA.
Author Alvin Snyder offers a less flattering reason for the creation of the BBG,
saying that the BBG is simply an attempt to replace the acronym for the Board for
International Broadcasting from the Cold War, which served the same purpose as the
current BBG. He says it is basically a name change. 99 The Board for International
Broadcasting also served as a firewall and administrator for grantee stations.
Despite this criticism, BBG Chairman Ken Tomlinson and the BBG’s five-year
strategic plan say the journalistic standards applied by BBG services will overcome
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negative opinions in the target markets and develop the credibility that builds audiences,
specifically in the Middle East. Credibility, as Bruce Gregory says, is the “coin of the
realm” 100 in statecraft, and so serving as the “firewall” is perhaps the BBG’s most
important function.
The Firewall
To establish credibility, the BBG is mandated to act as a “firewall” between the
government and the broadcasters. As noted before, the conference report that
accompanies the 1998 Act states that the consolidation of services under the newly
independent BBG:
Is not to deny that the broadcast entities are funded by the United States
government—quite obviously, they are. This structure in no way should be
construed to lessen the responsibility of the Board to ensure that U.S broadcasts
are ‘consistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States,’ as
required by . . . the 1994 Broadcasting Act . . . . But the concepts of ‘deniability’
and ‘firewall’ are not merely diplomatic fictions. In truth, the State Department
will be able to deny responsibility for a specific broadcast—because it will have
denied itself the ability to directly affect the content of any specific broadcast. It
can do so because the ‘firewall’ will have operational meaning.” 101
With this added protection, a diplomat can plausibly deny that he or she has any
say over content, and refer a disgruntled party to the BBG to address the issue, enhancing
the credibility of both State and the BBG. BBG Chairman Kenneth Tomlinson echoes
this thought, specifically regarding the Middle East Television Network:
Much of the criticism of Alhurra – again before we even launched – was that we
would be the mouthpiece of the U.S. Government sending cleared messages and
propaganda to taint Arab minds. None of our programming in any part of the
world seeks to do this. VOA’s long-standing Charter, and more recently the U.S.
International Broadcasting Act, guard against this. But we must demonstrate this
100
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every day to our audiences and their trust and loyalty over time. This does not
mean that we ignore our mission to promote and sustain freedom and
democracy. 102
Brian Conniff shares this view, and explains how the Board is responsible for
balancing the demands of meeting U.S. foreign policy goals and the independence of the
agency as a firewall:
It is in our Charter hanging up on the wall there. It is in the principles and the
International Broadcasting Act of 94, but those are all just documents. We live
and breathe it. We demonstrate every day that our programming is not
propaganda, and that it is a reliable source of news and information. A lot of
people do come to that conclusion, that we receive government funding, therefore
‘you’re broadcasting the interests of the US government,’ and we are broadcasting
the interests of the US government, but only in a very general way. How we
handle the individual stories and which stories to cover and how to cover them,
that is our business. We do not want the State Department involved.
One of my roles here is we are a firewall. And we talk about this all the
time, is that somebody from [the Department of Defense], or State Department
wants us to do a story or spin something, we tell them, ‘You can’t even talk to
that language service; you can’t pressure them. You need to come through us,
and then we’ll decide if it’s journalistically worthy.’ So, it is something you
prove everyday; it is something that you built up, in VOA’s case, over 60 years.
Your credibility is as good as your performance. That is how you demonstrate it,
and a lot of people will never buy that. 103
Many people will never concede that a government-funded broadcaster can have
true objectivity. The United States has relied are three degrees of separation between the
government and the broadcasters: 1) the journalistic charter for VOA; 2) the creation of
private corporations to serve as surrogate services operating via government block grants;
3) and the creation of agencies to act as “firewall” protection against direct government
involvement. As Brian Conniff explains, the government is involved only in the very
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broad policy decisions of the BBG, and the agency does not hesitate to enforce the
firewall:
Our role is to support American foreign policy. We would not get taxpayer’s
money if we were not in support of that, and our priority should be priority
foreign interests of the United States government. However, the methodology
that we use and the methods to push that forward are journalistic, not propaganda.
Once a year we always go to the State Department, and we get a briefing. We
ask, “State Department, you give us your worldwide, regional priorities.” That is
input into our thought process. Which languages do we want to expand? Which
ones do we want to cut back? Our broadcasting should be a reflection of that in
terms of priorities. How we do it is our business, program content and all that.
We are not interested in their suggestions. But, which countries – yes, we
certainly we are a reflection of American foreign policy. No doubt on that. 104
However, as the Board does continue to serve as the visible firewall between the
services and the Congress or other outside influence, Bruce Gregory says there are
different, possibly less noble ways in which the firewall has been invoked:
The argument that I think is compelling here is that [regarding] the news product-for that matter the program content--I am all for the firewall. I do not want
diplomats or elected political leaders trying to shape the news. I have no problem
with VOA interviewing Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader after 9-11. . . . But the
firewall, where it has huge value with respect to protecting those journalism
norms, it seems to me it’s also been used by broadcasters to fence off what they
do for budgetary reasons, for turf protection reasons . . . in the sharp elbows give
and take of Washington politics. So I give the broadcasters a lot of credit. When
the Djerejian advisory panel [on international broadcasting and 9/11] comes out
with a report, as it did in October 2003, which basically asked good questions –
and it really was an ‘in your face’ critique – the broadcasters fired back with a
press release, within 48 hours, [saying] ‘Firewall, firewall, firewall.’ 105 It seems
to me that, for a government funded enterprise such as international broadcasting,
the questions – of what technologies you use, what your priorities are . . . – are
strategic direction questions, and there the firewall is far less compelling as an
argument for leaving the whole thing up to a part-time Board of governors. 106

104

Personal interview with Brian Conniff
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. (2003). Changing minds;
winning peace. Report submitted to the Committee on Appropriations. United States House of
Representatives.
106
Personal interview with Bruce Gregory

105

57
Creation of the BBG and the Effect on Service Structure
The firewall is maintained between the government and the grantee organizations,
as well as VOA. However, the Board seems to feel that the grantee surrogates offer an
extra step of distance, along with some economic and administrative benefits, including
improved surge capacity and capability. Elliott notes that target audiences also are more
interested in regional or local news than about the Untied States, making the surrogate
format more desirable in terms of audience share, but less palatable for issues of U.S.
foreign policy goals. 107 The GAO reported in 2004 on the structure of the BBG, saying:
Each broadcast entity has its own legislated mandate. VOA’s mandate is to (1)
serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative, accurate, objective, and
comprehensive source of news; (2) represent America, not any single segment of
American society, and therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection
of significant American thought and institutions; and (3) present the policies of
the United States clearly and effectively and also present responsible discussions
and opinion on these policies. In contrast, the role of the surrogate broadcasters
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio/TV Marti) is to
replace temporarily the local media of countries where a free and open press does
not exist. WorldNet Television and Film Service [now part of VOA] provides
production and distribution support for television broadcasts developed by VOA
and the Department of State. The Board’s public diplomacy mandate also includes
helping to develop independent media and raising journalistic standards where
possible.
Thus, where a replacement media are needed, a surrogate serves best; where an American
position is needed, VOA serves best. Many feel that these two types of service are still
necessary, but Bruce Gregory says that the “distinction in today’s world is far less
persuasive, far less compatible . . . . Today, when you have information-rich societies,
attention is the scarce resource. And so for attention to be gained in highly competitive
broadcast markets, you need a much better product. You need to be highly credible; you
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need to find ways to be consistently reliable and to provide a value-added in a multichannel world, because people can flip a button, turn the dial, channel hop; it is a much
tougher challenge. So to have as many different services as broadcasting now has, it
seems to me weakens the voice of all... Now I appreciate bureaucratic fights that go on in
broadcasting. . . . I would think there are advantages to collaboration that would outweigh
the continuing advantage of two services. 108
Elliott echoes this assessment, noting that the distinction is diminishing, and that
listenership times do not necessitate two services. He says, “Combining the broadcasting
content into one station would require tighter program editing, but, if done skillfully,
would result in more attractive output without any significant sacrifice of substance. . . .
In the days of tighter budgets, the United States can no longer afford redundancy in its
international broadcasting services. . . . This task is difficult enough for one international
radio station; it becomes almost impossible when U.S. efforts are split between two
organizations.” 109 Competition with local media will also increase as they become more
capable of high-quality production and content, making the need for maximum efficiency
almost overwhelming at current budget levels.
Proponents of this consolidation suggest the privatization of VOA to provide
needed economic and administrative efficiencies that are not available in a federal
service. The GAO report 04-711T says, ““Board members and senior planners told us
they encountered some difficulties attempting to work with officials to launch Radio
Sawa within VOA’s structure and were later forced to constitute Radio Sawa as a
108
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separate grantee organization.” 110 Though this move may have caused a “further
fragmentation” of international broadcasting, these alleged “difficulties” may explain the
propensity of the BBG to develop new services as grantees. There are several levels of
unions in the federal structure, both organizational and related to the physical plant of the
BBG that must clear many actions that occur. There are also (necessarily) stringent
guidelines for force expansion and reduction in a federal agency. This leads to an
ongoing discussion regarding the privatization of the broadcasters, particularly of VOA.
However, Brian Conniff says there are no plans in progress to do that:
People do ask from time to time . . . would Voice of America be more flexible to
changes in the world situation, does federal policy – personnel policy for instance
– does that inhibit the ability to be flexible and respond. Well I suppose there are
two schools of thought. Some people think it does, because each time you stop
one service and then start another service, you have to go through some fairly
elaborate reduction of force procedures in order to terminate people . . . . So yeah,
there’s a school of thought that it would be more efficient administratively and
then the same school of thought is that that distance that is created between the
government entity and the private non-profit provides the reality and the
appearance of more journalistic independence, which is one of the reasons why
RFE was created the way it was and that would be useful to VOA’s credibility.
So those are the two arguments in favor of it.
Other people are concerned that if you got too far removed, then it
wouldn’t be the VOA, it wouldn’t be representing or articulating American
foreign policy, and you can’t ask a private corporation to do it the same way as a
government.
Tedstrom warned a RAND conference on international broadcasting in 1993 that
increasing the distance of any service of U.S. international broadcasting from the
government would jeopardize its future funding. 111 The further the service moved from
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dealing directly with the public and Congress, the more likely would be a reduction in or
removal of funding
Conniff says that the pressing issue is the format that will best serves to maintain
the independence of the broadcasters without causing a separation, noting that many
concerned parties discuss consolidation in services and administration more frequently
now.
They will ask, ‘Why is RFE/RL the way it is and why isn’t VOA? If
one’s this way, they ought to be the same way.’ Questions have been asked about
the apparent proliferation of all these organizations, government and grantees,
why cannot they all be administratively under the same umbrella so you only have
one procurement department, personnel department, so forth. That question gets
asked a lot, particularly when you look at some of the organizations having the
same service. RFA has a China service, Burmese service, so does VOA. Radio
Free Europe has Radio Free Iraq, and then we have Radio Sawa. They both
broadcast in Arabic into the same country, and there is some belief that if there
was a hierarchical structure - administrative structure, decision-making structure that you would be able to deal with those overlaps in a more efficient way. . . .
You would be able to reallocate your resources in a more efficient way, because
you may have to take some from here and put it over there in a certain situation.
If the organization over here is resisting that, which is what typically could
happen today, then it is harder to do. But if you had authority that came all the
way down and was just in a position to say, ‘You will give up those resources,
and you will receive those, and you will start broadcasting tonight,’ I think the
belief is the more centralized structure would be more responsive and quicker to
react. 112
Conniff seems to indicate that the core surge capacity of the BBG would be
improved by such streamlining, moving towards the mandated (and planned)
improvement in that ability. Even though the structure may be seen as a barrier to
efficiency, David Jackson defends VOA’s success as a federally funded entity, and is
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resistant to privatizing it. He reinforces the distinction between the VOA mandate and
that of the surrogates:
VOA, first of all, is the oldest and largest, by far, of the US international
broadcasters. And VOA was created for a specific reason at the time, and that
was to counter propaganda during the war by being sort of a beacon of truth. It
was not to counter propaganda by putting out our own propaganda. It was a novel
idea of countering it by being the one place where – whether the news was
favorable or not – you could rely on what we said. That was a very wise strategy
because it meant that we won very loyal audiences, which we still have today for
the same reason. And it also meant that it made the United States look good for
providing such a service. Now, it was a unique creation to have the government
support an independent journalistic organization. That was very unusual; it still is
very unusual, but after 60 years, I think we have shown that it can be done
effectively. The reputation we have built up over that time shows that these are
not easy reputations to build for credibility. You know you have to win that. You
do not automatically get granted a respect for being credible. VOA has shown that
we are independent, that when the news was bad, when the news was
embarrassing…during Watergate or during the Clinton administration scandals,
VOA still reported it and people respect the United States for providing
something like that.
We have rigorous sourcing rules, which have been a model for all the
other international broadcasters. Every one of them has adopted our standards,
because they were good ones and they resulted in credible broadcasts. I believe
that as long as VOA can show that it can be competitive in a very challenging
international media marketplace, that we will be a viable and effective
representative of the United States. . . . There are many different strategies you
can take to reach out to audiences, and the US should have many different
strategies and try different approaches. But the Voice of America approach has
been effective over a long period of time and that is not easily done. We have
shown that we can continue to be effective, even in the era of CNN and other
international broadcasting competition in the digital age. We can be nimble; we
can start programs fast; we can change programming; we can use all the modern
broadcasting techniques that contemporary broadcasters use. We can use the
tools; we are all digital; we have got the internet. We are very competitive. . . .
I do not think we need to create another one like it, because VOA has done
that. But I do think it is viable. A large part of the reason for that is thanks to the
charter, which the BBG supports and defends. They are the firewall that protects
us, that protects our independence. It was a tribute to the President and the
Congress that they gave VOA the freedom to be independent, and I believe that
VOA has lived up to that responsibility. 113
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The caveat emptor to the idea of journalistic independence as defended by the
agency and its members and congressional supporters comes from Wasburn. In his view,
“By obscuring recognition that news accounts inherently embody some perspective that
supports political interests, the professional ideology of Western media organizations
denies that they in fact have an identifiable perspective. Hence, it denies the very
possibility of congruence between the perspectives of the news organization and
government. However, it is precisely this congruence that accounts for the historical
infrequency of direct intervention of Western governments into the news-making
activities of their international broadcasting organization. That is, Western governments
tend not to censor, not because they are inhibited by cultural norms or by the legal
provisions of charters from intervening in the affairs of organizations that broadcast ‘the
truth’ to the world, but because they seldom have any real need to do so.” 114 By this
view, the firewall is not normally necessary, nor is the claim to “objective” journalism.
The point of having a firewall, though, is either the reinforcement of independence when
the broadcasters most need it, such as when a congressional resolution comes under direct
fire by a member of that organization's editorial staff, or to obscure government
involvement in a broadcast station.
David Jackson’s appeal to the record of the VOA as a viable entity, even as a
federal service, bolsters the position that the privatization of VOA would serve merely
economic and administrative efficiencies, rather than providing any sort of improvement
in quality, distribution, or listenership. The need to be faster and more responsive in
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crises is part of the Board’s mandate to shore up its surge capacity, so that it can
effectively respond to crises in U.S. foreign policy by increasing broadcasts to a
particular part of the world on very short notice. As an example of this capability, the
2001 BBG Annual Report highlights its rapid deployment, or “surge” into Afghanistan
and Iraq following the 9-11 attacks.
Bruce Gregory explains the challenge of developing the surge capability that the
BBG hopes to gain by privatizing its services and streamlining VOA:
I think it is a tough challenge. Very tough challenge. We are always surprised
that the best minds in the U.S. government did not predict the Korean War, did
not predict the Cuban missile crisis, did not predict the South Asian nuclear tests,
did not predict 9-11. There are a lot of things we did not predict. . . .
[One recommendation of the Defense Science Board] is to provide a way
to tap into language skills, communication skills, when you need it, on a ‘just-intime’ kind of basis. I think that sounds good in theory. It might be a lot harder
to do if all of a sudden you need a sophisticated broadcasting operation in a heart
language, which you are not broadcasting in now. Just to go from a standing start,
doing that, is a tough question. Having said that, you still have the question of the
extent to which broadcasting is the most effective way for a government to
communicate in the society. And I think you could find arguments that your
money could have been spent on other things in some societies. 115
The Future
With the continuation of the debates over content and scarce resources that have
followed the VOA and BBG through their respective histories, Brian Conniff talks about
how the BBG could be made more responsive to changes in system needs,
We get frustrated when there is a crisis and we do not have the surge capability,
by the time you go through the long, involved budget process, the crisis is over, so
we have asked to have a contingency fund. We have never gotten it, you know.
Congress hates to give you money unless they know exactly what you are going
to do with it. But something like that would be an interest to have the ability to
respond quicker when there is a crisis because the budget process is just slow, and
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onerous, and not very responsive. We need to make sure we have a structure that
is responsive, that allows the single chain of decision making to work so [if] we
need to eliminate something over here and move it over there, that we can do it,
and it is hard to do that. It is really hard when you have this mish-mash of
government and private companies. It is not just one private company, it is
multiple private companies. Even though the board members sit on all of them which is an attempt on Congress’s part to make decision making a little cleaner.
You know how it works when you have either a corporate or a bureaucratic
structure, they resist those movements and those decisions. We are trying to
eliminate Radio Free Iraq, believing that between Alhurra and Sawa, there is
adequate Arabic language going into Iraq. RFE/RL, which houses Radio Free
Iraq, they believe that they still have a viable mission and they want to keep it
going. So there is an internal resistance to what the Board wants to do. Those
problems occur from time to time. So, coming up with a cleaner structure of
something that maybe would help us be a little more responsive and allow us to
deal with this inability to get money from Congress quickly is maybe we need to
find a more streamlined way of reallocation internally. That may be the one
answer to Congress not giving us a contingency plan. So, in general we need to
be more efficient and effective and one way of addressing it is to look at all these
different organizations and see if there is a way to pull them closer together. 116
In the enduring battle for hearts and minds, there is another key issue, and that is
the reaching of target audiences by these services. Without listeners, all of the political
wrangling and internal struggle is pointless. John Lennon addresses the issue of reaching
the target audiences by suggesting the BBG needs to figure out who the audience is
supposed to be:
The challenge that lies ahead for us is in the logistics of understanding and
selecting target audiences. That’s key. Why bother, why should we do all that? .
. . Why not just throw a signal up on short wave and do what we have always
done? . . . First, the world is listening to short wave in declining numbers even in
expansive areas like Russia and Africa and China. They gave up on short wave
decades ago in Latin America. Those people listen to FM, but mainly they watch
television. That’s part of the second deal that we have to contend with; the
VOA’s principal challenge ahead is going to be engaging smartly, affordably and
effectively audiences using new media . . . . There are some very fundamental
challenges that have nothing to do with content of programming and everything to
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do with technology and delivery. Those are issues that we have to grasp long,
long before we can compete. . . .
The Board has not caused all of the problems that the VOA currently
faces. The events have dictated some of the changes that have had to take place,
but what the Board has done . . . is that it has caused certain things to be dealt
with by the VOA that VOA had never had to deal with before. VOA has had to
shape its programming goals according to target area research. There has never
been a history of that here prior to the last five years. Never. Had not happened
since 1942. There had always been this separate agenda. . . . Instead, now the
Board has said ‘Here’s a pile of data and we now know more about how people
feel in Pakistan than we ever did before and we expect you to respond to that.’ . . .
So we’ve got new disciplines that have been imposed on VOA by the Board of
Governors over the last five or six years that it hadn’t had to embrace previously,
and that has been a very, very difficult – and in some cases genuinely painful –
adjustment for them to make. I will tell you, from my perspective they have not
made it completely, not by a long shot. It is going to take at least another half a
dozen years I think before they can say they have done it. . . . 117
David Jackson does not totally disagree with this idea, but explains how program content
is a tremendous challenge going forward for VOA:
Well, I think the biggest challenge facing VOA is the same one facing every
broadcaster in the world, and that is to be competitive in an increasingly
competitive marketplace. Audiences, even in developing countries, have more
and more choices, and it is very challenging, it is very hard to get their attention.
Whether you are VOA or whether you are a local broadcaster, we all are fighting
for those audiences, and to reach them, we have to be really good. We have to
have good programs. They have to be professionally produced, they have to be
interesting, and they have to provide them something that they’re not getting
somewhere else . . . . So we are increasingly focusing on that kind of content,
which is not only of interest to those audiences, but it also fulfills our vision.
Another challenge is being on the medium that people use. Currently that
is increasingly television. . . . We’re still pushing; we’re still expanding in
television, but in the future it’s going to be more and more on the internet, and we
already have a web presence in every one of our languages. But that may also lead
to other devices. It may lead to text messaging. It may lead to things that have
not been invented yet. 118
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Grand and nebulous as these aspirations may sound, the idea of “web presence”
indicates only that there is at least one page, or portion of a page, devoted to a given
language service. It does not indicate a multi-page “website” devoted to each one.
As VOA expands into the costly world of TV and the Internet, longstanding
services are being reduced. The BBG says of its budget proposal for FY 2007:
Faced with the increased costs of expanding critically needed television
and radio programming to the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world, the Board has
had to make some painful choices.
“Every member of the Board of Governors regrets the loss of VOA
services proposed in this budget," Tomlinson said. "The men and women who
provided these services for many years served with distinction and provided
programming that were critical to this nation's interests. However, the Board
believes that the priorities reflected in this budget proposal represent the best
allocation of funds.”
Tomlinson also says, “The competitive edge in the Middle East is our dedication
to truth and free and open debate. We will provide an example of democracy and a free
press in a media market dominated by sensationalism and distortion.” 119 The shift in
emphasis to the Arab and Muslim areas of the world demonstrate clearly the foreign
policy goals of the United States and the impact those goals have on the direction of the
BBG and its services. Even with a nearly $672 million budget, resources are said to be
scarce. Several of the remaining eastern European services are being cut, or reduced to
TV and internet only. Shortwave efforts are being cut back substantially, as fewer people
rely on that medium to get their news, pushing the “old ways” of doing international
broadcasting into retirement, along with the people who made it work.
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5. CONCLUSIONS

Purpose
The purpose for VOA and other services serves as the validation for their
existence. Therefore, discovery of the purpose should lead to a discussion about how the
structure can serve to achieve the purpose.
The current administrators seem to feel that the broad purpose changes very little
for the international broadcasters when the world situation changes. The debate over the
purpose of the U.S. international broadcasters has occurred since the earliest days of
1942, when VOA officially went on the air. The conflict has always been over whether
the broadcasters should advocate for the American position, or if they should tell
America’s story to the world. Many early leaders of the parent organizations felt that the
function of broadcasting was to advocate for the American position as a true propaganda
agency, and were convinced that it was their job to help shape foreign policy. Others felt
that the journalistic norms of the free press should be imposed to help build credibility
with foreign audiences. This position places the job of telling America’s story on the
staff of the services. John Lennon perhaps has stated the clearest critique of the search
for purpose, by saying that the role of the services is clear, depending on your
perspective. If the administrators and board feel that the direction of the agency should
be towards a propagandistic, edgy tone, then they will seek to direct the agency in that
direction, etc.
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Several groups already discussed in this paper suggest that the international
broadcasters should be returned to a position with significant input on national security
and foreign policy issues, leading to an advocacy mission. For example, the Public
Diplomacy Council’s “Call for Action on Public Diplomacy” recommends a cabinet-level
position for public diplomacy officials, including broadcasters. This is exactly what the
early propagandists wanted to do, to have a place in shaping U.S. foreign policy. This
seems appealing at first glance, but the broadcasters are non-elected and (mostly) nonappointed civilian employees of an executive agency, hired to be content producers.
Broadcasters should not serve as shapers of foreign policy; they are reactive to it. The
BBG Strategic Plan notes the purpose of a public diplomacy broadcaster is to spread a
predetermined message to a predetermined area via mass media and other channels
controlled by that broadcaster as much as possible. The public diplomacy broadcaster is
to be a receiver of guidance on overall policy, not the creator of it. The broadcaster then
searches to find all of the facts on a topic, and creates content to present the balanced
story. That facet of broadcasting and journalistic norms allows the agency to remain
independent; if it were a policy creator, it would have to be brought under more direct
oversight, sans firewall, and at the expense of credibility.
Another view says that, if the broadcast services are an agent of public diplomacy,
then they should fall into the State Department realm. History has demonstrated that
State has not liked broadcasters, and vice versa, specifically in regards to policy
decisions. That is part of the reason for the independence of BBG when USIA folded
into State. The State Department and the BBG do coordinate efforts on some
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programming, such as community health or agriculture, which is not propaganda in any
sense other than as a goodwill ambassador.
The needed policy input comes in the form of the BBG receiving its report
annually from the State Department on what State feels the BBG’s primary target areas
should be for a given time. Thus, the BBG is a receiver of information via a one-way
valve from the executive, and so it should be. There is nothing particularly preparatory in
the training of journalists or broadcasters that would equip them with special knowledge
regarding foreign policy.
As suggested, proponents of the idea tend to be those who want the BBG and
VOA to advocate for the American position. All of these groups are careful to separate
international broadcasting from other public diplomacy functions, but still group it
together with “strategic communication” initiatives, which would ultimately return
control of the broadcasters to State. Proposals to create a Cabinet-level position, or some
sort of advisory commission to oversee public diplomacy information campaigns, are an
attempt to bring the BBG services again under more direct authority of the government.
This is emphasized when the Djerejian committee report says that all international
broadcasting should be brought under a new advisory board, except for the news
function. This movement of the firewall is one of many suggestions for restructuring of
the agency. However, it seems that anyone who attempted to bring the news function
under direct control would kill the deal; to the Congress and the broadcasters, the
journalism protections are mandated and sacrosanct. This suggests that the current level
of input is a positive result of the BBG structure.
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Most students of the BBG seem to feel that the purpose of the BBG services is to
demonstrate a free press system to countries where no such free press. In the early days,
the VOA was to “tell America’s story” to the world, while the surrogates broadcast more
local and regional news and (sometimes) incited revolution or reform by advocating for
the American position. The difference between the surrogate and federal, as Bruce
Gregory notes, is not as compelling as it once was, because no one is playing innocent
that these services are funded by the U.S. government. Thus, progress toward
privatization of all BBG services could be a positive move for the BBG, allowing it a
greater freedom in matters of personnel and administration.
Until such changes occur, the federal and grantee services should never compete
on purpose. This means that unified policy guidance may be necessary throughout the
organization. If a strident tone is needed by a grantee, it should not conflict severely with
a federalized services need for guidance. If the goal is to tell the truth as the BBG asserts,
then it must tell the truth, even if it is in strident tones. A BBG policy office would be the
way to do this, as opposed to individual ones at each surrogate service and the IBB.
Here, the firewall does not move, but policy decisions are vested firmly at the federal
level.
Some would say this creates the monolithic problems associated with State
Department supervision, i.e., very slow policy guidelines that delay operations. To
address this, policy from the BBG level could come in the form of an annual report that
would follow the meetings with the State Department to hear their goals for the year.
This would allow the BBG to provide broad guidance, leaving the day-to-day decisions to
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the locals, subject to the review process. The BBG is, after all, supposed to be only a
part-time board, though the current board has subsumed much of the operational control
of the agency under its direct supervision, poking holes in the firewall.
I suggest that VOA, RFE/RL, RFA, and MBN are now primarily content
providers. If they became solely content providers, then I would structure the IBB to
become a purely technical branch of the BBG, overseeing the acquisition of materials
(transmitters, etc.), time on affiliates (OMPP), and administration of the physical system.
A new office at the BBG level would be in charge of coordinating efforts between the
IBB and the services (a liaison) in terms of the physical system. All services would be
responsible for their own personnel choices - something that is allowed in the grantee
model, but is currently handled by the IBB on the federalized side. Since they would be
merely content providers and not responsible for the transmission, they would be
separated a step further. This effectively moves the firewall to the IBB level. The IBB
would be absorbed as an office of the BBG, with many or all of its present functions
intact. However, all current IBB oversight functions would be moved into the BBG
offices. This move would probably force the privatization of VOA, since its overall
structure would closely resemble that of the current grantees.
Once the individual components became content providers and the physical
system was owned and operated by the U.S. government, VOA and the grantees would
bid contracts for program content, pitching ideas to the BBG, with the best ideas awarded
development contracts in the way the TV networks do. This would create an internal
competition that would improve quality, but also keep the material fresh and competitive
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in local broadcast markets. Annual reviews of programs (not channels) would result in
contract extensions or in calls for new ideas. Without doubt, this could result in the
elimination of one or more privatized services if performance was not consistently up to
the standards of the other services.
In reading the BBG’s FY 2005 Performance Annual Review (PAR) report, there
appear to be advantages for having all grantee organizations: \1) the administrative
efficiencies which a non-federal corporation has, namely in the hiring and/or firing of
personnel; 2) the starting and stopping of a given service without normal force reduction
procedures; 3) and the extra distance provided from the government to the broadcaster. .
There is no longer a need for stridently toned services and a federalized service
that speaks more politely within the BBG structure. The attachment of services to their
funding is readily traceable, unlike in the early days of RFE/RL. Thus, having a grantee
that seeks to be a surrogate service and agitate for revolution no longer provides plausible
deniability for the government, State or otherwise. It does not matter if the day-to-day
operation of the service belongs to the service, if the government (and the BBG is a
government executive agency) ultimately controls its policy goals. The Congress would
pull funding in an appropriations minute if it found the BBG to be operating outside of
the broad policy interests of the U.S. The focus on Muslim countries and Arabic
populations exposes the level at which this “broad policy guidance” intervenes in
language service choices. It may be broad guidance, but it is firmly in control of the
basic decisions of the BBG. For example, the BBG has cancelled services in several
eastern European countries where a U.S. presence could meet long-term strategic
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interests, in order to meet short-term demands of the “War on Terror” currently
underway. We have spent years and billions of dollars in earning the respect and trust of
these audiences, and often leave them in a tumultuous political climate when we close
their language service.
Continuing to broadcast in overlapping language services creates competition and
encourages innovative thinking within U.S. broadcasters. If this method continues, the
services should be funded at competitive levels, i.e., appropriations of performance
bonuses for language services that clearly demonstrate that they are meeting the mission
of their entity and the board. The VOA Arabic service may have performed just as well
as Sawa if it had been funded at the same level, with the same program content and the
same technical support.
If consolidation does occur, the complementary services of VOA and grantees
should be day parted to meet audience desires when they would most likely to listen.
Consolidating into a single service could mean the improved performance of the whole
unit. If this occurs, a single brand name would make worldwide marketing more efficient
and effective. Branding all products with the VOA moniker would mean that it came
from America, and all services would be merely independent content providers. VOA
would be merely a central brand, while the content production for everything else would
be left to the private entities. An example of this would be a product produced by
RFE/RL that would proclaim at its end, “This is a production of RFE/RL for the Voice of
America!” Both get credit, but the central brand increases its exposure.
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When discussion begin about the privatization of VOA, there seems to be a
prevailing fear among legislators, a-partisan, that the “other guys” will get control of the
private organization, leaving the first group unable to overcome the legislative block on
interfering. This may lead to a lack of will on the part of any Senator or member of
Congress to attempt the privatization. Any direct influence has been precluded by the
legislation enabling the BBG to act as a firewall between Congress and the constituent
services.
The firewall is a matter of perception. Structurally, the Congress should have no
direct immediate input into programming decisions or news topics. To do so, according
to the Strategic Plan, would stifle the journalists into self-censorship. Thus, the Congress
(judiciary and executive also) is removed a step from the decision-making process.
However, the decision-making process is influenced by State, and Congress holds the
purse strings to make the agency bend to its will.
Those who invoke the firewall are very often attempting to engage in a turf war
that has consumed more than its share of good ideas. This war has frustrated the efforts
of managing agencies throughout the years of the VOA. Sherwood, Warburg and Barnes
left because they wanted to use VOA as an attack weapon in the war of ideas, while the
Congress (which then had oversight) wanted an externally motivated service that would
tell others in the world about America. Most recently, infighting over changes in VOA
Arabic led to the creation of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks of Radio Sawa, al
Hurra TV and Radio Free Afghanistan, all as private grantee corporations.
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However, the grantee structure is also a matter of creating perception. The BBG
is a bipartisan committee, appointed by the president, with a balanced membership, with
the chair predictably a member of the executive party at the time. These board members
oversee the operations of VOA, and are required by law to sit on the boards of the
grantees. This is a bit of obfuscation of control, and that is all it is. If the same members
oversee VOA as oversee the grantees, then they are under one and the same leadership.
Again, they are separate in name only. This leads to the conclusion that the
organizational structure should thus be the same for all types of service.
Some suggest this is not necessarily the case, because the goal of BBG services is
to demonstrate how a free press system works, which can be difficult with a governmentfunded system. To ensure that the service remains on the air and is not abandoned
because of commercial media constraints (i.e., no financial return on investment), the
government should fund a service, but should have no say in its day-to-day content.
Thus, the “broad policy guidance” should be broad in the broadest sense, meaning that
individual language service decisions should be made by the services, not by the
government.
There is still a need for a services charged with the same mission as the Voice of
America, because America still needs a voice by which it can communicate with the
peoples of the world in a direct manner. It is still the most vital component of U.S.
international broadcasting. It would not and should not work as a true propaganda
agency, to retain credibility with an audience. However, if the government tells the truth,
why does it matter if it directly or indirectly funds the service? Perhaps it is because of
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an innate mistrust of the target audiences for what governments have to say. Why would
they trust what they know to be the words of their own government and not those of
another government? Why would they trust an indirectly funded program more than one
that is directly funded? Since the distinction seems to lack force since the end of the
Cold War, then the continuation of grantees should be for content distance, personnel
efficiencies, and administrative streamlining. If BBG services clearly express the fact
that they are funded and guided by the government, and people still give them such high
marks for accuracy, objectivity, and trustworthiness, then there is no need for a surrogate
service to hide its identity.
The greatest reason for maintaining a firewall between the government and the
journalists is if the journalists are of a different opinion than the government. This
protects dissident voices in its best incarnation, and protects subversives in its worst, i.e.,
McCarthy’s investigation. There must be some level of distinction at which subversives
are removed from the agency, without creating the negative environment of the 1950’s.
There is a continuing question of whether any or all of the stations should air
official policy editorials. One argument is that the government is providing funding for
the stations, and the editorials are delineated clearly as being the opinion of the
government, therefore all stations should air them. These editorial remarks are clearly
propaganda (truth-value undetermined), and occur next to programs and coverage that
may suffer a credibility loss by accompanying official U.S. statements. However, the
question remains as to whether or not the loss of credibility overwhelms the gain of
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informing elites and the general population about the specific position of the U.S.
government.
Surge Capacity
One of the most baffling aspects of the operation of the international broadcasters
is the mandate to shore up their surge capacity and capability. This quick startup of a
service in a target area is to meet a short-term interest of foreign policy, such as pre-war
Iraq. VOA has an awkward relationship with its unions that makes this very difficult,
and is the reason for the privatization of the Radio Sawa.
One option for overcoming this would be to incorporate an activating clause in
the legislation continuing appropriations for the services. This activating clause would
temporarily, and for a defined period, bypass the normal constraints of the BBG Act,
remove the firewall, and allow for a direct command from the top of the chain to the
service with the nearest technical surge capability. The top of this chain would be the
BBG chair, acting on an executive order that is limited severely in its burden to prove
that such a direct command is necessary. This command could only address WHERE the
broadcasters go, not WHAT they transmit. This would be an emergency powers kind of
thing, with a definite end period (6 months, 2 years, etc.). The order would be initiated
by the Secretary of State with the approval of the President via an executive order. The
danger in doing this is that tinkering with the enabling legislation could lead to a
restructuring of services by overzealous legislators who have no direct authority over this
executive agency.
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Another suggestion is that the military should be in charge of the surge capacity
function, moving into captured areas or strategic areas to set up stations and take over
transmitters. Once the situation was resolved to a more peaceful level, or when the
military uses for the station were through (i.e., the end of full engagement of forces), the
BBG services could be brought in on the same frequencies and help with the rebuilding
efforts. This would not remove BBG services from their pre-engagement status (as in the
case of RFE’s early days) in the battle for hearts and minds. There is a surge capacity in
the sense of the ideological war, and then there is a sense synonymous with Wild Bill
Donovan’s using news “as guns fire bullets.” The military already conducted broadcasts
into Iraq prior to the invasion, though Norm Pattiz and others claim that the military
failed miserably in their attempts.
Perhaps the best suggestion is that of Brian Conniff, by which the Congress would
provide BBG with an emergency or contingency fund to allow one-time startup costs for
surge stations and reallocation procedures. Use of this fund would have to demonstrate
clearly that the new target area was indeed a priority in the foreign interests of the United
States. Unused money would be rolled into the next fiscal year’s budget to help pay for
budget increases for the BBG.
The Future
The arguments over the purpose of VOA and the BBG will rightly continue into
the future, as the agency seeks to balance the foreign policy demands and journalistic
norms mandated by its founding legislation. At any time, the majority party or
administration will have its ideas of how to improve services, or have a strong desire to
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have its own perspectives dominate the airways. The maintenance of the firewall is
therefore an absolute necessity. This protection of the day-to-day operations of a free
press serve as a best means of gaining credibility among target audiences, and of making
them desirous of such freedoms.
The purpose of all of the services is to exhibit how a free press works. However,
they also must all tell America’s story to the world. This can be accomplished by more
than producing features and news stories about America (the current VOA role), but by
simply telling the truth, which we believe is our perspective. The difference between this
and a true propaganda organization is that the truth-teller can admit when he/she has
made a mistake; the propagandist must continue to spin the lie. Admitting a mistake adds
credibility to other things that are said by the broadcasters. William Harlan Hale’s
famous words ring true again today, “For us the news may be bad. For us the news may
be good. We shall tell you the truth.”
To meet this purpose, the structure of the BBG must be flexible enough to change
as quickly as it can, while maintaining a firm footing in its founding legislation and stated
goals. The BBG must continue to streamline its operations to meet budgetary demands,
while shoring up its surge capability. This means that at any given time there are
resources not available to current services because of the possibility for a need to surge
somewhere else. Thus, the contingency fund should be approved for the BBG, with the
cost of starting up a regional network, including radio, TV, Internet, and other
distribution technologies. As several committees and professional groups have
suggested, the funding for the international broadcasting function should be in
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accordance with the size of our world presence, not as a “Hegemon” 120 but as a clear
Voice of America.
General Observations
Generally, there must be agenda setting at some level, because not everything that
happens in the world can be reported. Thus, whether the journalistic mission or advocacy
mission prevails, both may defend themselves by claiming objectivity. The federalized
service hopes to influence people and change minds by focusing on the news and
lifestyles of the United States, or reporting the news of the world from a free press
perspective. They claim objectivity because of the environment in which they operate,
where their decisions and articles are edited by superiors, rather than by government
officials seeking to tone down the work. However, inherent personal bias causes the
“objective” reporter to focus on certain topics and sources, to the exclusion of others.
Thus, the agenda that is set may be unintentional, but still exists.
The difference with a surrogate broadcaster is that the agenda is set clearly from
the foundation of the organization. RFE was founded to attack the communist ideology
of Russia as evidenced in its satellite countries. The agenda was to do anything that
would promote reform or outright revolt within the countries, without the need for
portraying the United States’ perspective. The tone of these stations was harsh because
the agenda was set to confront directly an ideology.
What we have here are semantic issues. The agenda is set either way. Whether it
is called “objectivity and demonstration of a free press” or “propaganda” does not make a
120

This is author Orson Scott Card’s word for the hegemonic ruling body of the galaxy in the classic book
Ender’s Game.
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difference in the core issue. The goal is to win hearts and minds to favor the transmitting
nation or group.
I think that the battle comes to a showdown between theories of persuasion and
media effects. Though most communications scholars would balk at suggesting the
average viewer is directly and powerfully influenced by every program they watch, many
of the population in general seem to feel that the media have a very powerful, direct
impact on the listener or viewer. Many scholars would accept that there are times when a
message will make a bigger impact, and sometimes that is through the periphery of our
conscience. This may explain what happened in Germany with the people who
knowingly supported Hitler’s takeover bid for the world. It was not that they were duped
into doing something they were unwilling to do, but that they were influenced by a
medium that increased the salience of an issue with which they were already in accord.
Ergo, the pizza commercial at dinnertime is the most effective because it increases the
salience of the Pizza Hut at a time when hunger is beginning to be an issue for the
viewer. A demonstration of this (though not entirely causally linked) is the sudden
increase of viewers and listeners to U.S. international broadcasting prior to, during, and
immediately following an attack by the U.S. or its increased involvement in an area.
If this is true, then the numbers for Radio Sawa immediately upon its
establishment are not nearly so impressive when compared to the long-term numbers of
VOA-Arabic. Numbers increase because salience of content increases. If the people of
Iraq and Afghanistan are only listening because we have a military presence in their area,
they will stop listening as soon as the threat that we will bomb their house subsides.
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They may also be listening because they want to compare what they hear on local media
with the BBG services and our Armed Forces networks. Another reason for the rise in
listenership numbers may be that the people are lying to surveyors, whom they may see
as spies for the U.S. forces, or as general authority figures. Thy may then acquiesce to
what they think the surveyor wants to hear (“Please don’t kill me; I listen to your
station!”)
I must reiterate that, if we are telling the truth, there is no reason to be wary of
having a true propaganda agency, promoting the ideas of our nation as a good way to
improve the quality of life for developing countries. The main concern of having such an
agency is a fear that the “other guys” will have control of it at the “wrong” time. This
may be addressed by the very factor that encourages instability in the organization: the
political appointment of top officials by the President. The leadership and direction of
the agency tend to shift with each director. However, the pressure that slows change—
normally seen as a bad thing—helps to keep the general direction of the agency aligned
with the direction of the country.
Future and ongoing research should study the long-term ideology of news and
features programming at the Voice of America and the other constituent services of the
BBG in whatever future form it may take. The Inspector General of the State Department
is not able to do this, but at least the academy should be aware of how much “objectivity”
and “freedom of the press” are mantras not necessarily based in “bald fact.” 121 This urges
a quantitative analysis of substance and tone of BBG programming.

121

Elmer Davis’s term for objective truth, mentioned in Chapter 3.
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